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ABSTRACT
ORIGINS OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO IN THE CONTEXT OF
UNITED STATES STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN THE CARIBBEAN (1938-1950)
Gonzalez Sosa, Francisco J, M.A. Mankato State University. Mankato,
Minnesota. 1995. 80pp.
The purpose of this paper is to explore the political and military
considerations that provided the frame of reference for the promulgation of the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico in 1952. Since 1492 possession of this island
has been coveted by nations with vital interest in the Caribbean region. To the
United States, who conquered the island in 1898, Puerto Rico formed the
backbone of the defense perimeter for the Panama Canal and adjacent
shipping lanes. Experience during World War 11 and the subsequent threat from
the Soviet Union reinforced the military value of the island. The importance of
the geostrategic location of the island to the United States was the crucial factor
that determined the type of political system that substituted fifty years of U.S.
colonial rule with a measure of self-government. The leadership of Lufs Munoz
Marfn and the moderate ideology of his Partido Popular Democratico (Popular
Democratic Party) proved to be the best vehicle for the implementation of the
reforms that would guarantee both the preservation of U.S. sovereignty over
Puerto Rico and the improvement of the welfare of the people of the island.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION
The Island of Puerto Rico is located in the middle of the Antillean
archipelago that runs between Florida and South America. With a territorial
extension of only 3,423 square miles, Puerto Rico is the smallest of the Greater
Antilles which also includes the islands of Cuba, Jamaica and Hispaniola. The
mountainous terrain is the dominant topographic feature, while the tropical
climate and abundant rainfall provide an ideal environment for many species of
plants. However, due to the isolation from the continental land masses, Puerto
Rico contains few native animal species (mostly reptiles and birds). These
factors influenced the economic development and the pattern of settlement that
evolved on the island. 1
The first evidence of humans in the Greater Antilles date from around the
1st. century AD, when groups of hunter-gatherers, believed to have come from
the Florida Peninsula, settled along the coasts and rivers of the islands. Latter
arrivals were the Arawak or Taino Indians who emigrated into the area from the
northern coast of South America around the year 500 AD, eventually displacing
the earlier inhabitants. The Arawak were-Elf) agricultural people ,with a relatively
complex social organization. They were the first Native Americans encountered
by Christopher Columbus when he landed in Guanahanf (San Salvador, one of
the Bahamas Islands) on October 12, 1492.
During his next voyage to the Caribbean, Columbus landed on Boriquen
(the Arawak name for Puerto Rico) on November 19, 1493. The explorer
' For a review of the history of Puerto Rico until 1898, see Loida Figueroa, Breve historia de
Puerto Rico, 2 vols. (Rio Piedras, Puerto Rico: Editorial Edil, 1979).
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3
claimed possession of the island for the Kingdom of Spain, but did not establish
any outpost or try to investigate the interior. No attempts were made to colonize
the island until 1508, when Juan Ponce de Leon built a fort near present-day
San Juan. Ponce de Leon befriended Ag0eybana, a powerful chieftain in
Boriquen, and relations between the Spanish newcomers and the Arawaks
were at first cordial. The colonists dedicated themselves mostly to the mining of
gold which they found in limited supply. As gold output dwindled, the colonists
increased their increased demands for land, food and forced labor from the
indigenous inhabitants. Such exploitation ignited an Indian revolt in 151 0 that
was put down with difficulty. Many among the defeated Arawaks withdrew into
the mountains of the interior while others left to join the Carib Indians who lived
in the islands of the Eastern Caribbean, still free of European domination.
The period following the Arawak uprising was characterized, paradoxically,
by the rapid decline of the Spanish settlements in Puerto Rico. The Spaniards
left because they exhausted the gold deposits and decimated their Indian labor
force. The Arawaks died in large numbers as a result of the spread of diseases,
overwork and destruction of their social order. African slaves were introduced in
1513, mostly to work in the fledging sugar cane plantations, but they could not
completely satisfy the need for labor. The news of the conquest of Mexico and
Peru produced a severe loss of population, as many settlers abandoned the
island for the greater riches of the new parts of the Spanish empire.
Despite the lack of economic importance and rapid depopulation, the
Spanish government understood the strategic value of Puerto Rico as a
military outpost for protecting the Armadas, the galleon fleets that every year
sailed from Panama carrying valuable cargo from South America and Mexico to
Spain. Other European nations also realized the advantages of controlling

4

Puerto Rico and, beginning with the French in 1528, launched intermittent
attacks on the island. In response the Spanish authorities commenced to build
a series of fortresses to defend San Juan, the main port and city. Due to the
poor state of the economy local taxes alone could not finance the military
constructions and support the garrison, and in 1582 a subsidy from the Mexican
treasury (the situado), was authorized to pay the cost of defending Puerto Rico.
The fact that the island was an economic liability to the treasury was more than
compensated by the military advantage it gave the Spanish against the
European rivals encroaching into their territories.
These defenses were tested time and again by continued attacks from the
English (the notorious Francis Drake in 1595 and the Earl of Cumberland in
1598), the Dutch (in 1625) and assorted pirate raids during the next two
centuries. By the end of the 18th century the defenses of San Juan consisted of
a wall around the entire city, the large fortresses of San Felipe del Morro and
San Cristobal and several smaller redoubts (San Antonio, San Geronimo and
Isla de Cabras), all garrisoned by around 2,500 regular troops with ample
artillery.
The emphasis on the military readiness did not translate into an
improvement of the economic and social situation of the island. Small-scale
production of sugar, tobacco, ginger, rice and assorted tropical fruits generated
only limited income. Hides and salted meat also became important exports
during the seventeen and eighteen centuries, mostly to supply passing ships.
But again, the income was meager. Compared to the gold and silver producing
zones of the mainland, Puerto Rico became a marginal area in the Spanish
empire.
However, during this period of isolation and backwardness, the people of
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Puerto Rico developed distinct cultural and ethnic characteristics. Spanish
intermarriage with the Arawaks and with the African slaves gave rise to a
racially mixed population. Although modified by the incorporation of Indian and
African traits, Spanish culture remained predominant. Spaniards imposed their
religion, government and economic system on the island. High officials in the
Church and government, plus wealthy merchants and landowners occupied the
privileged positions in society. The poor consisted of free peasants, slave
plantations laborers and marginal day laborers.
The United States War of Independence (1775-1783) and the French
Revolution (1789) set the stage for a series of profound social, political and
economic changes in Spain and across the Spanish empire in the Americas.
The sugar industry in Puerto Rico developed in earnest, as well as the
production of coffee. Liberalization of the rigid trade policies increased exports
to not only the the rest of the Spanish empire, but also to the new markets of the
United States. The improving economy and the intellectual influence of the
revolutions in North America and Europe contributed to a more precise
definition of Puerto Ricans as distinct people. This sentiment was enhanced by
the defeat in 1797 of a final British attempt to conquer the island. During the
battle the local militia claimed their share of the victory when they rescued the
outnumbered regular Spanish garrison. Despite their victory, however, a Creole
move toward reform and autonomy was cut short by other developments.
The outbreak of the Wars of Independence in Mexico and South America in
181 O ironically strengthened the ties of the island to Spain. Many royalists fled
to the island from Venezuela, Peru and Mexico, bringing not only their property
and skills but also their unconditional pro-Spanish allegiance. By 1824 the
Spanish empire in the Western Hemisphere comprised only Cuba and Puerto

'
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Rico. Once the mainland had become independent, the elaborate fortifications
on the island suddenly became obsolete. Rather than be concerned about
external threats, the military garrison in Puerto Rico began to worry more about
internal unrest. Since the colonial authorities viewed any requests for reforms
with suspicion, they blocked even minor changes. The governor, always a
military man appointed by the Crown, had almost unlimited powers to rule by
decree. Furthermore, the fear that the political unrest in Spain would reach
Puerto Rico also worked against the development of reform in the
administration of the colonies. 2
By the late nineteenth century the reformists elements among the Puerto
Rican political leadership managed to obtain from Spain the granting of greater
powers of self-government. The Carta Auton6mica (Autonomic Charter) of 1897
allowed for the election of a legislative body who was in control of virtually all
aspects of the administration of the island, except for matters of defense and
some international relations. The Spanish government granted the requests for
reform to Puerto Rico to avoid a repetition of the unrest in Cuba, where a violent
rebellion launched to achieve the independence of that island began in 1895.
The Carta Auton6mica was also extended to Cuba, in the hope that this would
help pacify the country, but the main revolutionary forces there would not agree
to anything short of total independence from Spain.
These reforms were hardly in place when the coming of the SpanishAmerican War forever changed the island. Following the declaration of war on
April 25, 1898, between Spain and the United States over the Cuban
2

Between 1833 and 1878 Spain experienced two major civil wars, several regional
insurrections and coups, the substitution of the Queen by an Italian prince, this followed by the
proclamation of a republic, before reverting again to a constitutional monarchy. For more
information see Antonio Ballesteros y Beretta, Historia de Espaf"la e influencia en la historia
universal. (Barcelona, Spain: Salvat, S.A., 1943).
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independence issue, Puerto Rico was subjected again to attack by a foreign
power, this time a stronger nation than those of past centuries. After a
short campaign, most of the island was occupied by U.S. forces and eventually
ceded to the United States by the Treaty of Paris. This agreement initiated the
close political, cultural and economic relationship between Puerto Rico and the
United States which continues to the present. From the earliest days of the new
rule over the island, however, it became clear that, despite the hopes of the
leading politicians and civic leaders in Puerto Rico, the United States presence
was not a prelude to independence but merely the exchange of one colonial
master for another.
From 1900 to 1940 the United States lacked a coherent policy toward the
island. Debate among U.S. functionaries centered on the issue of eventual
statehood for Puerto Rico. Some felt that after a period of cultural and political
"Americanization" this could be accomplished. while others pointed out that the
racial and cultural differences were too strong and the economy of the island
too weak to warrant incorporation into the Union. Symptomatic of this
ambivalence was the fact that U.S. citizenship was not granted to Puerto Ricans
until 1917, at the same time that a very limited form of self government (the
Jones Act) was introduced. The Jones Act was designed to substitute the
Spanish laws still in effect. While granting some powers to a legislative body,
the governor (appointed by the President) could not only veto any legislative
actions but could, in effect, rule by decree. The Federal government, both
Congress and the President, retained control over most economic and
administrative affairs of the island. The political parties that developed in Puerto
Rico during this period were mostly concerned with changing the colonial
relationship between the U.S. and the island by achieving either statehood or

8
independence.
At the end of World War II the status situation of Puerto Rico became a
dilemma to U.S. policy makers. For the United States to maintain a colonial
possession provided the Soviet Union with an important propaganda weapon
which the Soviet delegates to the United Nations did not hesitate to use. But at
the same time the U.S. considered Puerto Rico a strategic asset, whose military
installations proved to be very valuable during the war, and that were expected
to be employed again in case of a similar attack from the Soviet Union. For this
reason, the U.S. military wanted to retain unrestricted control of the island. This
dilemma was solved by the emergence of a new political force, Lufs Munoz
Marfn and his Partido Popular DemocraticQ (Popular Democratic Party), that
succesfully steered Puerto Rico toward the present Commonwealth status, a
form of political autonomy which was acceptable to most Puerto Ricans as well
as to the United States. The genesis of this Commonwealth position and how

1,
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the Puerto Rican leaders involved in this process found common ground with

I,

l,

1,.

il

U.S. military and political officials will be the focus of this paper.

l

Several publications dealing with the origins of the Commonwealth have

t

focused on the political process in both Washington and Puerto Rico, the
juridical and constitutional issues that guided the development of this formula,
or the socio-economic background of the relationship between the island and
the U.S., without describing the reasons why the U.S. was concerned with
maintaining a presence in Puerto Rico. The climate of confrontation with the
Soviet Union and how that was perceived by U.S. policymakers helped to
shape to a considerable degree the development of the Commonwealth
alternative. Gordon K. Lewis in his influential book Puerto Rico: Freedom and
i
'
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Power in the Caribbean3 sets out to describe both the societal evolution in the
island since 1898 and also how the resulting model of Puerto Rican-U.S.
relations fits into the changing world of nationalist and decolonization
movements then (1963) sweeping not only the Caribbean area but much of the
developing world.
The author states that :
(t]he Puerto Rican experience ... raises problems of some urgency in the
modern world ... Is the welfare-state ideology (all contemporary
nationalist movements espouse it) in itself sufficient to withstand the
emergence of a Westernized class society ... ? Will the new colonial
nationalisms repeat the errors of Western nationalism? Can 'democracy'
emerge and survive in situations profoundly different from those
surrounding its original rise in England, France and the United States? ..
What fresh relationships between politics and culture will arise?4
Lewis regards the process that led to the proclamation of the
Commonwealth in 1952 "as simply the end result of of a sixty-year old process
whereby Congress has progressively handed over successive shares of the
Congressional governing power to the island," 5 at the same time retaining the
power to revoke all laws approved by the Commonwealth, including the
Constitution of 1952 itself. Concluding that Puerto Rico remains basically a
U.S. colony, Lewis indicates that only independence could allow Puerto Rico to
fully develop socially and economically. The author, however does not discuss
the national interests (political, economic or military) that compelled the U.S. to
maintain the final say on all matters regarding Puerto Rico.
Arturo Morales Carrion reviews the advent of the Commonwealth in his

3

Gordon K. Lewis. Puerto Rico: Freedom and Power in the Caribbean (New York: Monthly
Review Press, 1963).
4
Ibid., 22.
5
Ibid., 415.

10
comprehensive work Puerto Rico: A Political and Cultural History giving a
detailed account of the political career of Lufs Munoz Marfn and the rise of his
Partido Popular Democratico. and how the desire for social and economic
reform in Puerto Rico supported the overhaul of the colonial political system
then in place. Morales Carrion also describes the attitude in Congress to the
various proposals made during the 1940's to achieve such reform. He explains
as well how the strategic military location of Puerto Rico during World War II
shaped the political discourse during the war. The author, however, does not
present the continuing military importance of the island after 1945 as one of the
driving factors behind the granting of Commonwealth status. Instead, he
focuses on the political need to accommodate the situation of Puerto Rico to the
post-war impetus toward ending colonialism:
[i]f in 1940-1945 Puerto Rico had played the role of a Caribbean Malta. from
1952 onwards it became a bastion of democratic thought and action in the
Caribbean. Many in the Caribbean and in Latin America traditionally favored
independence; but others admired the way Munoz and his associates were
transforming a heritage of poverty and want while progressively achieving
growing powers vis-a-visthe most powerful nation in the world. 1
The author's main point is that after the approval of the Commonwealth, the
United States was able to convince many Latin American countries that Puerto
Rico no longer was a colony but an equal partner in an association with the
U.S. With their support, the U.S. managed to have the island withdrawn from
the United Nations list of colonial territories, an important diplomatic success.
The essays collected in Puerto Rico: The Search for

a National Policy' and

edited by Richard J. Bloomfield represent the range of ideological opinions
6

Arturo Morales Carrion, Puerto Rico: A Political and Cultural History (New York: W.W. Norton

& Co., Inc., 1983).
1

Ibid., 282.

s Richard J. Bloomfield, ed., Puerto Rico: The Search for a National Policy, (Boulder, Westview
Press, 1985).
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regarding the development of the Commonwealth status. The editor indicates
the relevance the political situation of Puerto Rico " . . . as it represents a
dichotomy between American ideals and institutional reality. Puerto Rico is an
anomaly in the U.S. political system."° Characterizing the island as a colony, he
contends that because the U.S. succeeded in removing the island from the
United Nations' list of non self-governing territories in 1953 does not mean that
the status situation was permanently resolved. This is the common thread that
runs through all the issues presented by all the contributors to this book.
The editor contends that the Commonwealth formula was the product of a
compromise that would simultaneously satisfy the diplomatic needs of the U.S.
(i.e, at the United Nations and to improve relations with Latin America), the
desire of Congress to maintain ultimate control over the island, and the genuine
desire for political self-determination a:id economic improvement that the
people of Puerto Rico demanded. Such an arrangement was bound to face
opposition sooner or latter as the original premises upon which the compromise
was crafted changed or became obsolete. For example, the economy of Puerto
Rico in 1980 was totally different from that of 1940, and the focus of U.S. policy
toward Latin America shifted from a desire to obtain diplomatic support at the
U.N. to striving to defeat leftist revolutionary movements in Central and South
America. However, neither the editor nor the contributors comment on the role
that the island has as the key link in the defense perimeter of the United States
against any possible Soviet military incursions in the Caribbean region.
Gerardo Navas Davila in La dialectica en el desarrollo nacional: el caso de
Puerto Rico 10 presents another interpretation of the path that eventually led to
9

Ibid., 1.
Gerardo Navas Davila, La dialectica del desarrollo nacional: el caso de Puerto Rico. (Rio
Piedras, Puerto Rico, Editorial Universitaria, 1978).
10
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the establishment of the Commonwealth. The author describes the national
character, the concepts of identity and national conscience, of Puerto Rico as
determining factors in the formulation of the Commonwealth status as the
pragmatic ideological solution to the colonial system created by the U.S. since
1898. In this analysis the strategic and military value of the island is at best of
secondary concern to the economic aspect of the U.S.-Puerto Rican
relationship. Navas Davila proposes that until 1947 Lufs Munoz Marfn and the
Partido Popular Democratico were really trying to improve the economic and
social picture of Puerto Rico and terminate the stranglehold that U.S. owned
companies had on the sugar industry (the main economic activity}, in order to
prepare the island ultimately for political independence. The author states that
"[f]aced with an American imperialism that, while "tame" on political issues, was
'aggressive,' 'crafty' and 'intelligent' on economic issues, Munoz realizes the
impossibmty of an economically viable independence" 11 (this author's
translation).
To Navas Davila the creation of the Commonwealth is the product of the
need to respond to the concerns of both U.S. interests and local elites, and to
preserve their economic power by allowing a degree of political autonomy at
the same time that ultimate control remained in U.S. hands. The reason why
Munoz Marfn accepted this arrangement is because he was certain that this
was the only achievable alternative to the status quo.
In contrast to the above positions, this work will concentrate on the place of
Puerto Rico in the Cold War. The Commonwealt~, option satisfied U.S. leaders
because they retained sovereignty over the island and direct access to
11

"Frente a un imperialismo americano que, aunque "bobo" en lo politico, era "agresivo",
"habil" e "inteligente" en lo econ6mico, Munoz admite la imposibilidad de una independencia
econ6micamente viable.", Ibid., 98.

13
important military bases. The Commonwealth option also provided enough
autonomy to minimize the accusations of colonialism hurled at the U.S. from the
Soviets and others at the United Nations. On the other hand, Luis Munoz Marin
accepted the Commonwealth because it provided an opportunity to concentrate
on the island's social and economic problems. Under the Commonwealth,
Puerto Ricans might still shape their own society. To Munoz Marin complete
independence would have been to costly to achieve and thus would have
undermined programs for the alleviation of poverty.
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CHAPTER II

INTERNATIONAL SETTING
Even before the end of the hostilities in Europe in 1945, the United States
and the Soviet Union had already begun to shift their policies, from wartime
allies to future adversaries. 1 The onset of the Cold War between 1945 and 1948
was marked with events that included the Berlin blockade, the civil war in
Greece, the Soviet-sponsored unrest in Turkey and Iran, the triumph of
Communism in China and the continuing repression of the Eastern European
countries then under Soviet occupation. In 1946 and 1947 U.S. President
Harry S. Truman granted military aid to Greece and Turkey in order to stop any
Communist take-over of those weak states. This small beginning led to a worldwide policy of "containment", which the U.S. maintained for the next 45 years. 2
U.S. military supplies, training and economic aid were sent to the war-torn
countries of Western Europe, Asia and the Middle East, the places where
conflict with the Soviet Union was most likely to take place. However, the
international situation was further complicated by the rising tide of nationalism
and demand for independence emanating from the crumbling European
colonial empires. In Africa, the Americas and Asia, the demands for recognition
of the national identities of the colonial territories were common and rapidly
increasing. This trend toward sovereignty and the end of foreign rule over large
areas of the world first became evident in Southeast Asia, where strong pro-

Martin F. Herz, The Beginning of the Cold War. (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University
Press, 1966), 130-140.
2
Miroslav Nincic, United States Foreign Policy: Choices and Tradeoffs (New York: CQ, Inc..
1988), 31-35.
1
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independence movements were active. The Philippines obtained their
independence from the United States on July 4, 1946., as previously agreed
before World War 11. 3 In 1947 Britain dismantled their Viceroyalty of India and
stood aside as nationalists forces created the states of India, Pakistan, Ceylon
(Sri Lanka), and Burma (Myanmar). In the Dutch East Indies a guerrilla
campaign against the Netherlands resulted in the granting of independence in
1949 to the Republic of Indonesia. The most violent and tragic episode of this
period, was the the large-scale warfare that erupted in 1946 in Indochina
between the Vietnamese and the ruling French authorities. Following these
examples, nationalist leaders in Africa and the Americas also demanded selfdetermination. The United States policy in this post-war era sought to balance
the demands of Cold War distrust for revolutionary unrest, that might be
exploited by the Soviets, with the ideological commitment and sympathy felt
toward colonial societies wanting political self-determination. Also, as all the
colonial powers were allies or close friends of the U.S., President Truman did
not want to undermine their positions, even if the United States was openly
critical of colonialism. 4
This overall strategic situation was reflected in the debate on how to
proceed regarding any proposed modifications to the current political
relationship between the United States and Puerto Rico. The possibility that the
naval and air installations in the island might not be available in case of a
global conflict with the Soviet Union, was a major concern for U.S. military
planners. The reason for the continued importance of the Puerto Rican facilities
3

This was approved by Congress with the passage of the Tydings-Mcduffy Act in 1934,. See
Carmelo Rosario Natal, Lufs Munoz Marfn y la independencia de Puerto Rico (1907-1946}. (San
Juan: Puerto Rico, First Book Publishing, 1994) 80-82
4
Robert J. Donovan, Tumultuous Years:The Presidency of ~ S . Truman, 1945-1953.
(New York: Norton, 1982) 22-23.
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was the Soviet Navy's post-war emphasis on submarine warfare and the role
that submarines expected to play in a confrontation with the United States.
. The U.S. military was influenced by the course of operations during World
War II, and by the actions of German U-Boats (submarines) in the Caribbean
and Middle Atlantic in particular. After Germany declared war on the U.S.,
following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, Admiral
Donitz, commander of the U-Boat service, set into motion Operation
Paukenschlag (Drumbeat), a raid by 5 submarines against Allied shipping
along the Eastern seaboard of the U.S that between January 12 and February
6, 1942, sank 25 merchant ships. 5 This was followed in March of the same year
by Operation Neyland, the attempted destruction by U-Boats of the oil refinery at
the island of Aruba, largest in the world and critical for the processing of crude
oil from Curacao and Venezuela. 0 During the first six months of 1942, the UBoat offensive resulted in the loss of 397 ships sunk in the home waters of the
U.S. Navy. 1 British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, whose country depended
on overseas supplies, was alarmed at these losses and wrote to U. S. President
Franklin D. Roosevelt on March 12, 1942 stating:
The situation is so serious that a drastic action of some kind is necessary, and
we very much hope that you will be able to provide additional escort forces to
organize immediate convoys in the West Indies-Bermuda area by
withdrawing a few of your destroyer strength from the Pacific. e
U.S. strategists were also extremely concerned with these developments.
In June of 1942 General George Marshall wrote to Admiral King, who was in
charge of U.S. Navy operations in the Atlantic, about the effects of the German
5

Michael Gannon, Operation Drumbeat (New York, Harper & Row Publishers, 1990), 296
Cesar de Windt Lavandier. La Sequnda Guerra Mundial y_los submarinos alemanes en el
Caribe. (San Pedro de Macoris, Dominican Republic: Ediciones U.C.E., 1982). 72-76.
6

1

Gannon. Operation. 388-389
Lieut. Col. Eddy Bauer. ed. Illustrated World War II Encyclopedia (Westport, Connecticut:
H.S. Stuttman Inc., 1978), vol. 6, 730.
6
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attacks:
The losses by submarines off our Atlantic seaboard and in the Caribbean
now threaten our entire war effort. The following statistics bearing on the
subject have been brought to my attention: Of the 74 ships allocated to the
Army for July by the War Shipping Administration, 17 have already been
sunk.22% of the bauxite fleet has already been destroyed. 20% of the Puerto
Rican fleet has been /ost(emphasis added). Tanker sinkings have been 3.5%
per month of tonnage in use. We are all aware of the limited number of escort
craft available, but has every every conceivable improvised means been
brought to bear on this situation? I am fearful that another month of two of this
will so cripple our means of transport that we will be unable to bring sufficient
men and planes to bear against the enemy in critical theaters to exercise a
determining influence on the war. 9
The tide finally began to turn against the U-Boats by 1943, due to a
combination of factors: improved coordination between U.S. and Allied forces,
increased number of aircraft and ships for patrol and convoy escort duties,
introduction of advanced technologies such as radar and sonar for the detection
of submarines, availability of intelligence derived from the breaking of the
ENIGMA code (allowing the Allies to read secret German military messages),
increased production of ships in the U.S. to replace losses, and the construction
of a series of military bases in the Caribbean and South America to provide
continued protection to Allied ships in the region. 10
The fact was that the United States in 1941 and 1942 was caught
unprepared to meet the U-Boat threat, and that most of the naval forces
available at the time were diverted to the war against Japan in the Pacific with
few left for Atlantic duty. Also, the U.S. could not completely count on the help
from Britain, its only ally with a significant navy, whose forces were already
stretched to the limit in other theaters of war. This weakness of the U.S. forces
in the Caribbean at this time raised the prospect of a German invasion of the
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islands as a steppingstone for an attack against either Latin America or the U.S.
itself. The U-Boat exploits were also a great asset for German propaganda
efforts aimed at encouraging the always latent anti-U.S. sentiments among
many sectors of the Latin American population. To coordinate those efforts the
Germans utilized the Spanish fascist Falanga organization. 11
After World War II the U.S. planned for a possible repetition of a large-scale
submarine offensive, but this time launched by from the Soviet Navy. The U.S.
was aware that the Soviets had concluded that, while they possessed strong
land and air forces, their naval strength compared to that of the Western Allies
was insignificant. Soviet Premier Josef Stalin decided on a program to build a
modern navy, but realizing that this would take years to complete, he ordered
the creation of a strong submarine force (using captured German technology)
as a way to have a credible naval offensive capability in the interim. 12
Soviet naval planners had studied closely German U-Boat operations, and
were aware of their devastating effects on Allied shipping. Admiral Sergei
Gorshkov, Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy, described the impact of the
German submarines on the disposition of the numerically-superior Allied
navies:
More than 2,000 British and American anti-submarine warfare combatants
and specially configured merchantmen and several thousand aircraft were in
operation against the German U-Boats in the Atlantic Theater. For each
German U-Boat, there were 25 British and U.S. warships and 100 aircraft,
and for every German submariner at sea there were 100 British and American
anti-submariners. A total of six million men were thrown into the
antisubmarine war. One can hardly find a similar ratio of attacking to
defending forces among all the other branches of the armed forces! 13
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In his final analysis of the submarine war, Adm. Gorshkov concluded that
the main reason why the U-Boats ultimately failed to stop the flow of supplies
across the Atlantic was that the Germans underestimated the capabilities of the
submarine and had not built enough units at the start of the war to press their
initial success. Time proved to be on the side of the Allies, allowing them to
develop countermeasures to defeat the U-Boats. 14 The Soviet Navy was
determined not to make this same mistake, and had an inventory of close to 300
submarines by the early 1950's. 15
In view of the increased demands tor the deployment of military forces and
economic resources in other areas of the world where confrontation with the
Soviets appeared imminent, the U.S. decided to shoreup its position in Latin
America and the Caribbean by increasing its political and military ties to the
countries of the region. An "Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of
Peace and Security'' was held from August 15 to September 2, 1947, at
Petr6polis in Brazil, attended by representatives of 21 American states for the
purpose of dratting a treaty of collective self-defense for the Western
Hemisphere. The resulting Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, also known as the
Rio Pact, was signed on September 2, 1947, and stated that all parties to the
treaty were obliged to come to the assistance of any state in the Hemisphere in
case of an attack. 16 To complement the Rio Pact, the U.S. Congress approved
the Mutual Defense Act of 1949, that allowed the sale of surplus military
equipment to countries in Latin America. 11 It was expected that these
14
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agreements would result in the improvement of Latin American armed forces to
defend their territories against foreign aggressors safeguarding the raw
materials and strategic shipping lanes (like the Panama Canal) vital to U.S.
industries and lessening the need for the deployment of U.S. forces to
accomplish these tasks. 18
On the wider diplomatic front, the U.S. was also concerned with the
utilization of the newly-created (1945) United Nations Organization as a forum
for the debate over the future of colonial territories and, as the decolonization
movement gained momentum, this issue came to the forefront of discussions.
The United Nations Charter included three chapters dealing with these
territories. Chapters XI, XII and XIII outlined the duties and obligations of
colonial powers toward subject territories, and the mechanisms to encourage
more autonomy for the same with the purpose of achieving eventual
independence. 10 Under the terms of the UN Charter, the United States was
compelled to submit periodic reports on the conditions of its territories (which by
1946, included Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Alaska, Hawaii, Guam,
Samoa, and the former Japanese possessions in the Marianas and Marshall
island groups in the Pacific). Many officials resented this outside intervention in
the internal affairs of the U.S. 20 They also maintained that these territories were
not oppressed and in fact had prospered under U.S. rule, thus rationalizing that
the United States was not really a "colonial'' power.
The Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc countries also joined the emerging
,e Ibid., 471-475.
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nations of the world in criticizing the U.S. for the presence of non-independent
territories under its control. As was the case regarding the colonies of
European nations, the Soviet position was stated both in ideological terms (that
is, colonialism as an expression of the capitalist system), and also as a product
of racist attitudes as applied to the ethnically different groups ruled by European
and U.S. colonial authorities. 21 Besides adopting this position at the United
Nations, the Soviet Union also engaged in more active ways to undermine
colonial rule. For example, the Soviets supplied weapons and equipment to the
Chinese Communist movement, engaged until 1949 in a bloody civil war to take
over China from the pro-U.S. Nationalist government. Once victorious, the
Communist leadership of China passed on much of this material to Vietnamese
insurgents in Indochina. Also, the program of indoctrination, propaganda and
the granting of scholarships to students from "colonial" parts of the world
(discontinued by Stalin during World War Two) was reactivated and expanded,
to include more activities in Asia, Africa and Latin America. 22 However in the
1940's, little meaningful support to revolutionary movements in those lands
could be given, due to the more pressing demands on Soviet economic and
military resources of the Cold War and the need to repair the extensive war
damage caused by the German invasion.
Regarding the nations of Latin America, the cultural and ethnic region of the
Western Hemisphere to which Puerto Rico belongs, the position of the
individual republics varied. At the United Nations and on other international
stages, the position almost unanimously adopted was that the state of Puerto
21
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Rico was a purely internal affair of the United States, and that they would
support any course taken by the people of Puerto Rico and approved by the
United States. 23 Only Mexico and Argentina periodically broke ranks with the
rest of Latin America to demand that Puerto Rico be granted sovereignty and
independence. 24
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CHAPTER Ill

POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SETTING IN PUERTO RICO
1898-1938

The events of 1938 mark a turning point in Puerto Rico's political history. In
that year, Lufs Munoz Marfn, the chief architect of the Commonwealth formula,
first organized a political party that captured the imagination of the Puerto Rican
people. The growing popularity of Munoz Marfn's party provided the domestic
and international base of support that made Commonwealth an acceptable
solution in 1950. His achievement stands in marked contrast to the preceding
40 years of U.S. colonial administration when U.S. policies, actions and
attitudes generated considerable discontent among the people of Puerto Rico.
The first few years of U.S. rule can be characterized as a period of
adjustment for Puerto Ricans to the new political, social, economic and cultural
realities now in place in the island. Foremost on the minds of the local political
leadership was the debate on what shape the relationship between Puerto Rico
and the the United States should take. Political parties were formed based
upon the three general tendencies developed during the Spanish rule: closer
ties to the colonial power (then as an overseas province of Spain and now as a
potential state of the Union), outright sovereignty as an independent republic; or
some type of autonomy as an intermediate step between the first two options.
Those who favored autonomy, however, were in the unique position to be
able to support their ideas with experience. The autonomists had at one point
achieved their goal. Their leader was a prominent writer and journalist who
arguably was the most experienced and highly regarded political figure in the
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island at the time. Through his efforts his party had managed to negotiate the
granting by Spain in 1897 of a Carta Auton6mica (Autonomic Charter),
guaranteeing a measure of limited self-government to Puerto Rico. His name
was Lufs Munoz Rivera, father of Lufs Munoz Marfn.
Lufs Munoz Rivera was born in the small town of Barranquitas on
November 6, 1859, to a moderately affluent family. His father, who owned a
general store, wanted him to eventually take over the business but Munoz
Rivera preferred to pursue a career in poetry and journalism. His political
activities began in earnest in 1887 when he joined the newly created Partido
Autonomista (Autonomist Party) whose leader, Ram6n Baldorioty de Castro,
advocated the creation of a type of self-government loosely based on that of
Canada's. 1
Support for such an arrangement was widespread among liberal
intellectuals and the criollo (native Puerto Ricans, as opposed to the
peninsulares or those born in Spain) professional and small landowner
classes. Conservative peninsulares, fearful of loosing their power and
influence to the criollos, accused the autonomists of secretly planning the
independence of the island. They succeeded in convincing the newly arrived
governor of the island, General Romualdo Palacio Gonzalez, that an antiSpanish uprising was about to be launched by the members of the Partido
Autonomista. General Palacio initiated a series of repressive actions known as
los compontes (and old term used in Cuba to describe forced confessions) that
included the arrest and torture of those he considered to be enemies of the
Spanish regime. The principal leaders of the autonomist movement were
imprisoned in San Juan and threatened with execution. Many others were
1
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jailed throughout the countryside, including people with no political convictions
accused as "revolutionaries" by personal enemies. 2
During this period, Munoz Rivera was collaborating with other liberal
leaders demanding the removal of the governor. Their continuous complaints
finally convinced the Spanish government to recall General Palacio, who
returned to Spain after only four months in office. However, the compontes had
effectively destroyed the old organization of the autonomists, even with their
principal leaders free again.
Lufs Munoz Rivera launched La Democracia, a newspaper that became a
platform for his political activities. In 1891 he began publishing a series of
articles in favor of forming an alliance or pact with any of the democratic parties
in Spain willing to accept his doctrine in favor of autonomy for Puerto Rico. 3
Munoz Rivera personally preferred to deal with the Partido Liberal Fusionista
(Liberal Fusionist Party) led by Praxedes Mateo Sagasta, who in the past had
declared his support for reforms in the administration of the colonies.
Between 1891 and 1895, Munoz Rivera matured as a political leader as he
tried to win over the rank and file of the Partido Autonomista to his plan for a
merger with the fusionistas in Spain. At the same time, he considered what type
of autonomous government would be both politically acceptable to the people
of the island and to Sagasta once his party attained power in Spain. By 1895
Spain was facing armed rebellions in its principal overseas territories
of Cuba and the Philippines. In Cuba, the revolt was launched by the poet and
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writer Jose Martf, who is considered a national hero in his country. He was also
concerned that the United States would interfere in the conflict and replace
Spain as colonial master of Cuba. 4 This placed the Spanish government under
great economic strain and heightened tensions with the United States, which
openly supported the rebels. 5 Meanwhile in Puerto Rico the Partido
Autonomista leadership appointed Munoz Rivera as leader of a commission
entrusted to go to Spain and begin talks with national parties that might favor
autonomy for the island. The commission arrived in Madrid on October 8, 1896,
and began negotiations that eventually led to an agreement with Sagasta and
the Partido Liberal Fusionista.
An unexpected series of events rewarded the foresight of the Puerto Rican
autonomist leadership. In October of 1897 Praxedes Mateo Sagasta was
appointed Prime Minister by Queen Maria Cristina, and without delay set out to
fulfill his promise to Munoz Rivera. The Carta Auton6mica (Autonomic Charter)
of 1897 gave Puerto Rico full representation in the Cortes, the Spanish
Parliament, and extensive rights to make commercial treaties and to control
trade and tariffs. The island was to continue to by ruled by a governor
appointed from Spain, but a new legislature consisting of a Chamber of
Deputies and an Administrative Council was to have control over internal
affairs. The first elections for the legislature were held on March 27, 1898, and
the autonomists captured a majority of the seats. 6 Luis Munoz Rivera became
the highest ranking Puerto Rican in the government, but the start of the
Spanish-American War on April 25, 1898 cut short the experience of self-
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government for the island.
The United States declared war on Spain after the warship Maine was
sunk by an explosion in Havana, Cuba. The U.S. blamed the attack on the
Spanish authorities and war was declared on April 26, 1898. After a short
campaign, the U.S. military defeated the land and naval forces of Spain and by
the terms of the Treaty of Paris1 Puerto Rico was ceded to the United States,
together with the Philippines and Guam.
The first government of the island was a military regime under General
Nelson A. Miles. Gen. Miles had led the campaign for the conquest of Puerto
Rico, and lasted in office until 1900. In that year Congress approved the Foraker
Act' that replaced the military government with a civilian one.
The government of Puerto Rico under the short-lived (1900-1917) Foraker
Act consisted of a governor appointed by the President of the United States, a
bicameral legislature formed by an Executive Council (appointed also by the
President) and a House of Delegates elected by the people. Also there would

be an elected Resident Commissioner as representative of the people of Puerto
Rico before Congress; he could speak, but had no vote. The laws passed by the
House of Delegates were subject to the Governor's and Congressional vetoes.
Lu, s Munoz Rivera was elected Resident Commissioner in 1910, and went
to Washington with the same agenda for greater self-government powers for the
island that he had taken to Madrid fourteen years earlier in 1896. His family,
including young Lurs, born in 1898, accompanied him. By 1915 Munoz Rivera
had succeeded in convincing a number of Congressmen and the administration
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of President Woodrow Wilson about the need for reform in the island. He
continued to point out that the Foraker Act did not provide for U.S. citizenship or
voting representation in Congress, in contrast to the Carta Auton6mica. Also
the Carta authorized greater powers to regulate commerce and taxation.
However, no concrete action was taken by Congress and at the end of the
session Munoz Rivera, in failing health, returned to Puerto Rico.
Again, international political and military events made possible further
political changes in the island. The entry of the United States into World War I
(1914-1918) on the side of Britain and France was imminent, and President
Wilson was concerned that Germany might foment anti-U.S. unrest in Latin
America. 0 Under these conditions Congress finally approved the Jones Act 10 on
February 20, 1917. The war on Germany was declared just a few weeks later.
The Jones Act created a new, and fully elective bicameral legislature for
Puerto Rico. It would have an upper house, the Senado (Senate) with nineteen
members, and a lower house, the Camara de Representantes (House of
Representatives) with thirty-nine members. All males twenty one years or older
were allowed to vote. The governor, who has veto power over all acts passed
by the legislature, continued to be appointed by the President of the United
States, as were (among others) the Attorney General and the Auditor. The
Commissioner of Education was also appointed by the President. This is
consistent with the policy set in Washington that the mission of the public
education system should be to make the future generations of Puerto Rico into
9
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better U.S. citizens. Great emphasis was placed on the displacement of
Spanish by English as the language of instruction in schools. 11 Another
provision was the granting of U.S. citizenship to the people of Puerto Rico
(incidentally, making them eligible for conscription into military service during
the coming war). There were no changes in economic, judicial or military
relationship between the island and the U.S. as defined by the Foraker Act. All
laws passed by the Puerto Rican legislature had to be sent to the President for
review at the end of the legislative session. Congress could also review and
overturn any laws approved in Puerto Rico. Defense, interstate and
international trade, control of coastal waters and navigable rivers, among other
matters, remained under the direct control of the Federal government. The
retention of such powers indicated the intention of the U.S. to intervene in the
island's politics should U.S. authorities see the need.
Luis Munoz Rivera died in San Juan on November 15, 1916 without having
any knowledge of the passage of the Jones Act. To the last he maintained that
the struggle for a better Puerto Rico laid in the attainment of self-government
and good relations with the United States. 12 The Jones Act would remain
essentially unchanged as the organic law of the island until 1949.
Changes in the economic development of Puerto Rico during this period
were as profound as those in the political arena. The most important change
took place in agriculture when sugar increasingly became the principal crop
replacing coffee, which had been the main export during Spanish rule. Before
1898 close to forty percent of the cultivated land was dedicated to coffee
production, as the Puerto Rican variety was very popular in Europe. However,
11
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the European markets had high tariffs on U.S. products, that were now applied
to Puerto Rico, and in the United States the cheaper, less flavorful Brazilian
coffee was preferred. 13 In 1899 hurricane San Ciriaco hit the island taking a
heavy toll of life and property and also caused great damage to the coffee
plantations.
Probably the most important factor in explaining the ascent of sugar was
the investment in mills and land from U.S. corporations, as it could enter the
mainland markets duty-free. Sugar quickly became the most important sector of
the economy. Production increased from 66,073 tons in 1895 to 866,109 tons in
1930, while at the same time, coffee production declined from 39,683,160 lbs. to
1,278,266 lbs. 14
This change from coffee to sugar led to the decline of the small holdings in
agriculture, as the sugar industry became increasingly dominated by
technologically advanced operations and large landowners. The plight of the
small farmer and the agricultural worker, the Hbaro. would become a central
aspect of the political climate of the 1930's.
Although both the Foraker and the Jones Acts provided for a series of
specific reforms in public services and agriculture. not enough was done to
solve the many problems facing the people of Puerto Rico. Since the early
1900"s, the political parties of the island were centered on the one vital issue
that clouded any discussion on the future of Puerto Rico: the status question.
The merits of either statehood or independence as a solution to the many ills of
the country were ceaselessly debated, but little concrete action was taken to
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4
' 1bid., 102-105.
'

3

31
address the immediate economic and social issues as common sense would
seem to dictate.
This was the political climate to which Lufs Munoz Marfn returned home.
The young Munoz had spent most of his formative years living in the United
States, attending Georgetown University and serving as assistant to his father
while Munoz Rivera was Resident Commissioner in Washington. After his
father's death, Munoz Marfn had stayed in the U.S., living in New York and
writing for several newspapers and magazines. However, he continued to follow
the political developments back in Puerto Rico.
On his visit to the island in 1920 Munoz Marfn first became directly
involved in the local political process. During his years in the U.S. he had
become influenced by Fabian socialism and was initially drawn to the Partido
Socialista (Socialist Party) founded by labor organizer Santiago Iglesias Pantfn.
Born in Spain, Iglesias Pantrn began to organize workers in his native country,
and Cuba, before coming to Puerto Rico in 1896. After the U.S. conquest of the
island, he formed links with the American Federation of Labor (A.F.l.), and
founded the Partido Socialista in 1915. The platform of the party rested on the
principle that the plight of the workers would be alleviated if the labor laws of the
U.S. were implemented by the island. Such implementation would be
facilitated by statehood. However, Munoz Marfn could neither support
statehood nor abandon his father's idea of autonomy, with eventual
independence. He once again departed for the U.S. to continue his literary
career. 15
While the Partido Socialista and the Partido Republicano (founded in 1900
15

Carmelo Rosario Nadal, Lufs Munoz Marfn y la independencia de Puerto Rico (1907-1946},
(San Juan. Puerto Rico, First Book Publishing, 1994), 42.

32
by Rosendo Matienzo Cintr6n and Jose Barbosa with an agenda of complete
assimilation of Puerto Rico to U.S. culture, economy and political system)
supported statehood, the Partido Unionista envisioned independence as the
ultimate goal. As one of the major parties of the island, the Partido Unionista
had won the legislative elections of 1917 and 1920 but had downplayed its
demands for independence in favor of first modifying the colonial government.
The Unionista Resident Commissioner in Washington, Felix Cordova Davila,
promoted the idea in Congress of an elective governor. In general, the proindependence forces were committed to work within the established political
system, as they were confident that the U.S. would eventually concede
independence to the island if a majority of the people requested so. The
radicalization of the pro- independence movement and the rise of Pedro Albizu
Campos and the Partido Nacionalista (Nationalist Party), came as a direct
consequence of the actions of the new governor appointed by the
administration of President Harding. 16
Emmet Montgomery Reilly became governor in 1921, having little or no
experience in public administration and knowing next to nothing about Puerto
Rico. 11 In his inaugural speech he made it clear that those who demanded
independence (i.e., the Unionistas) were "anti-American", that English and
"American" culture should eventually supplant Spanish and the local culture,
and reiterated that as long as the United States existed, Puerto Rico would
never be independent. 18 Governor Reilly's ideological mixture of extreme
conservativism, superpatriotism, fundamentalist Protestantism, and disdain for
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the people of Puerto Rico aroused strong opposition not only among the
Unionistas but also the Socialistas and many other sectors of society.
Eventually Reilly was recalled to Washington in 1922 at the request of the
Unionista-dominated legislature. The recall occurred after a barrage of articles,
editorials and letters (including some from Luis Munoz Marin, writing from New
York) protesting his actions. But now the Unionistas were determined to alter
their position on the question of the status to avoid future charges of "antiAmericanism." Their new platform referred only to obtaining a greater degree of
self-government. This led those who still favored independence to
split away from the party and form a new organization, the Partido Nacionalista
de Puerto Rico on September 17, 1922.
The first political parties formed under U.S. rule to advocate independence
were led by old leaders such as Jose de Diego, who had led the same struggle
against the old Spanish regime. However, in 1919 several new organizations,
such as the Juventud Nacionalista (or Nationalist Youth), founded by university
students, and the Asociaci6n Nacionalista (or Nationalist Association), founded
by professionals and intellectuals, also advocated independence. These
groups were formed as resistance movements against forced Americanization.
For example, the leader of the Partido Nacionalista, Pedro Albizu Campos 19 ,
equated independence with a rejection of "American" culture and influence and
a return to the Spanish traditions of the past. He also believed that it was
unlikely that the U.S. would grant the island independence in the future. Albizu

19

Pedro Albizu Campos (1891-1965) was born in Ponce. He attended Harvard University and
obtained a law degree in 1917. He also served as an officer in the Puerto Rican regiment raised by
the U.S. Army during World War I. Disillusioned with the Partido Unionista, he became a founding
member of the Partido Nacionalista and latter its leader in 1930. For more information see Cesareo
Rosa-Nieves and Esther M. Melon, Colecciones Puertorriquef'las, "Bioqraffas puertorrigueflas:
perfil hist6rico de un pueblo". (Sharon, Connecticut, Troutman Press, 1979), 15-17

34
Campos was convinced of the need for an armed uprising to free the country.
Numerous acts of violence and murder took place starting in 1932 as the
Nacionalistas battled against their political enemies and the police. 20 This led to
an intense polarization of society, driven by the heavy-handed actions of the
police and U.S. authorities.
On the other hand, the traditional parties that controlled the legislative
branch of the island's limited self-governing system were in disarray. The
Partido Unionista, weakened by its internal ideological differences, had
disappeared. The old Unionista leadership had reformed under the name of
Partido Liberal (Liberal party), but it no longer was a major party. The
Republicanos and the Socialistas, both supporters of statehood for the island,
had agreed on an united front for the elections of 1932. This common goal, plus
the fact that these parties were closely allied to the big industrial and sugar
interests, made their joint Coalici6n (Coalition) a favorite with the U.S.
authorities in Puerto Rico. 21
Lufs Munoz Marin made his definitive return to the island in 1931. He was
determined to remain involved in the political process of the island, and joined
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the newly-formed Partido Liberal. The Liberales at this time struggled to
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reorganize and reach a consensus regarding the status question. Ideologically
the party clearly agreed on opposing the continued dominance of the island's
economy by large U.S.-based corporations and dissatisfaction with the current
administrative arrangements. But a wide variety of proposed solutions
fragmented the party. There were strong pro-statehood and pro-autonomy
20
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factions while the leadership traditionally favored independence. Munoz Marfn
quickly became identified with the pro-independence group, and was selected
to run as candidate for the Senado in the coming elections.
The elections of 1932 came at a time of great economic distress in Puerto
Rico. Conditions on the island took a turn for the worse with the onset of the
Great Depression in 1929, aggravated in September of 1932 by the effects of
hurricane San Ciprian (that almost completely destroyed what remained of the
coffee and tobacco industries, and heavily damaged the sugar crop). There
were a number of strikes among the sugar cane workers demanding better
conditions and higher wages. As the corporations refused to negotiate, the
workers became more receptive to the Partido Nacionalista.
The Coalici6n of Republicanos and Socialistas won the elections of 1932,
although the Liberates became the strongest single party and Munoz Marfn was
elected as senator-at-large. He later was appointed as representative of the
Partido Liberal in Washington, where he promptly became acquainted with
many influential figures of the new Democratic administration of President
Franklin D. Roosevelt .
The increasingly vociferous Nacionalistas blamed the deepening of the
economic crisis on the colonial subjugation of the island by the United States.
On October 24, 1935 a group of Nacionalistas clashed with the police outside
the campus of University of Puerto Rico in Rfo Piedras. Three Nacionalistas
were killed and one policeman wounded. At the funeral, Albizu Campos stated
that their deaths would be avenged, and declared war on the chief of police,
Colonel Francis E. Riggs. On February 23, 1936, two Nacionalistas shot and
killed Col. Riggs but were captured shortly after. Then, while under police
custody, both men were executed.
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These events caused great concern in the U.S. government. The
authorities were determined to arrest Albizu Campos and crush the
Nacionalista movement. In Puerto Rico there was general disapproval of the
killing of Col. Riggs, but also of the actions of the police. Albizu Campos and
the top leadership of the Partido Nacionalista were arrested, convicted of
conspiring to overthrow the U.S. authority in the island, and sent to a Federal
penitentiary in Atlanta, Georgia. The rank-and-file Nacionalistas were now
more than ever determined to continue their struggle. To prove that even
without their leaders they remained a visible force, the party organized a march
on Albizu Campos' hometown of Ponce on March 21, 1937. After first
approving of the march, the U.S. authorities reversed themselves and ordered
the police to disperse the marchers. The police then fired into the crowd killing
twenty-one people. 22
The upheaval caused by the political violence between the Nacionalistas
and the colonial government did not go unnoticed in Washington. Senator
Millard E. Tydings of Maryland, a close friend of the slain police chief Riggs,
introduced a bill on April of 1936 to grant independence to Puerto Rico but with
punitive conditions. The Tydings Bill allowed for a referendum on whether or
not the people of Puerto Rico wanted independence. If the answer was yes,
then a constitutional convention will draw a constitution that would need to be
approved by the President of the United States and then voted on by the
people. After a four year transition period, the island would be independent.
However, once Puerto Ricans voted in favor of independence, all Federal
welfare and economic assistance programs will cease. The provisional
22
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government of Puerto Rico was expected to assume all costs for the
administration, defense and welfare of the people of the island. On top of this,
Puerto Rico would be faced with full tariffs on its exports to the U.S. at the end of
the four year transition period. The introduction of this bill sparked widespread
debate in the island about the status situation and forced the major political
leaders to take a stand on the issue of independence. 23
The Partido Liberal was faced with a growing rift between the old leader,
Antonio Barcelo, and Munoz Marfn. Barcelo wanted to seize the opportunity
and support the Tydings Bill despite the economic hardship that would befall the
island if independence was achieved under those terms. Munoz Marin,
however, considered that such a choice would impoverish Puerto Rico even
more, particularly the already poor. Also, he considered that in the upcoming
elections the Partido Liberal and the whole ideal of independence will now be
associated with the Tydings Bill:
The moment the Tydings Bill was presented the election were lost...They
were lost because it compels the sugar industry to spend all the money that
may be necessary to defeat the only party (the Nationalists don't count) that
stands for independence in Puerto Rico in an unequivocally [sic] way. The
Tydings Bill has created, through its unfair picture of economic ruin, a terror in
the minds of thousands of persons of the middle class and of the working
class. This picture can be wiped out by the reality, but not in four months ... But
have to save our people from falling into the worst possible reaction for many
years to come. 24
The Liberales lost to the Coalici6n in the 1936 elections by a wide margin,
a defeat blamed by the leadership on the official pro-independence stance of
the party. They eventually decided to drop their support for independence, and
expel those who refused to accept the new party line. Munoz Marin could not
conceive abandoning the ideal of independence, and broke away from the
23
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Partido Liberal.
On July 22, 1938, Lufs Munoz Marin founded the Partido Popular
Democratico (Popular Democratic Party), or PPD. Independence remained the
ultimate goal for Munoz Marfn, but the party would concentrate first on resolving
the many colonial problems of Puerto Rico. He set out to address the terrible
situation of the jfbaro. the rural peasant, and make this the centerpiece of the his
party's work. Munoz Marin realized that only the Federal government could
provide the technical and financial support needed to implement his plan, and
was encouraged by the progress of the New Deal programs created by the
administration of President Franklin D. Roosevelt. The PPD program
envisioned land reform and the enforcement of the laws banning the ownership
by corporations of more than five-hundred acres of lands (many individual
sugar companies owned in fact thousands of acres of prime cultivable land).
The equalization of income by means of progressive tax reform, increased
minimum wages and increased public assistance programs for the elderly and
disabled were other proposed measures. Lastly, the party proposed the
expansion of the economy as a whole by means of increased investment and
diversification in industry and agriculture.
In more than one respect, the activities of Munoz Marin during this time
mirror those of his father Luis Munoz Rivera fifty years earlier. Both father and
son were convinced that autonomy was the best alternative for improving the
economic and social condition of the island in the short run while leaving the
door open for future moves towards independence. Also, both men were
committed to finding a political middle ground that could equally accommodate
the aspirations for reform of the people of Puerto Rico and the concerns and
interests of the colonial ruler. This was reflected in their opposition to violence
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or revolution as an instrument of political struggle.
Another similarity was that for both Spain and the U.S. events in the
international arena focused attention on the political situation of Puerto Rico.
While in the early 1940's the United States was concerned with the possibility
expansion of German (and, after 1945, Soviet) power into the Caribbean and
Latin America as a result of social and nationalist upheavals, in the 1890's
Spain was equally alarmed with the prospects of U.S. intervention in favor of
Cuban and Puerto Rican pro-independence movements.
The PPD and Munoz Marfn campaigned feverishly during the months
leading to the election of 1940. They chose the pava. the typical straw hat of the
peasant, as their symbol and the words "Pan, Tierra, Libertad" ("Bread, Land

I

).

and Liberty") as their slogan. The party was counting on mostly poor rural
people as their base of support, and nobody was sure if they would vote.
A common practice at the time was for local party bosses to give one or two
dollars (a day's wages for many workers) to the peasants in exchange for their
support. Munoz Marfn countered that he was only asking them to "loan" their
votes to the PPD, and if he did not deliver on what was promised, they could
turn his party out of office on the next election. 25
Although the Populares came out of the election as the largest single party,
they did not win a clear victory. However they did have enough seats in the
legislature to began setting into motion their ambitious reform package. During
World War 11 and its aftermath, however, the pace and scope of the internal
sociopolitical development of the island would be affected by events in the
international arena which were beyond the control of the Puerto Rican people.
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CHAPTER IV

RESOLUTION OF THE STATUS QUESTION

By late 1940, Nazi Germany's war of conquest had led to the occupation of
most of Western Europe. The fate of the Caribbean colonies of France, the
Netherlands and Britain, countries either already conquered or at the brink of
collapse, suddenly brought to the forefront of U.S. military planners the strategic
importance of Puerto Rico.
Since early 1939 a series of strategic defense plans for the Western
Hemisphere, code-named "Rainbow", were prepared to meet a concerted attack
form the Axis powers (Germany, Italy and Japan). The formulation and adoption
of a hemispheric defense policy was part of the main mission of the United
States armed forces, which was the defense of the U.S. mainland against a
military threat. Key to the overall military posture was the defense of the
Panama Canal, 1 vital route of communication between the Atlantic and the
Pacific. Since it was determined that the Canal could only be attacked from a
base in the Western Hemisphere, the main thrust of the defense strategy was to
prevent the establishment of an enemy base in Central or South America within
range of the Panama Canal. As part of this objective, the U.S. Army concluded
that an air base in Puerto Rico was vital to the defense of the eastern
approaches to the Caribbean.
The military forces initially available in 1939 consisted only of a Navy radio
station in San Juan, and the Army's 65th Infantry Regiment, a Puerto Rican
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regular unit. Immediately a new airfield (Ramey Field) was constructed in
Aguadilla, and plans for Roosevelt Roads Naval Base in Ceiba completed.
Rear Admiral 8. H. Bieri described Puerto Rico's strategic importance to the
Navy as follows:
(a) Its central and forward position in relation to the Panama Canal and the
east coast of the United States.
(b) Its commanding position over all the approaches to the Caribbean.
(c) It is the only outpost among the islands of the Caribbean, with the
exception of the western part of Haiti and Trinidad, that could be
developed into a main naval base.
(d) If we are unable to use this base, the Unites States Fleet will need to
anchor in Panama or at Chesapeake Bay. 2
The deterioration in the European situation prompted a review of the
"Rainbow" planning. The new plan, "Rainbow 4", pointed out the need for
additional bases in Latin America in general, and the Caribbean in particular;
the occupation of the European colonies in the Caribbean and military
assistance to the states of the region. Greater military cooperation with Britain
was later added. The military policy of the U.S. regarding Latin America
continued under these guidelines throughout the war.
In the fall of 1940, President Roosevelt sent an investigation commission
into the Caribbean. The Commission included Rexford G. Tugwell, a
controversial member of the advisory committee that President Franklin D.
Roosevelt created to manage the the social and economic programs of the New
Deal. He held a number of positions in the Roosevelt administration and, from
1941 to 1946, served as governor of Puerto Rico. 3 The Commission concluded
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that drastic social reforms were needed, together with military measures, in
order to secure the area. Tugwell criticized not only the colonial administrations
of Britain and France, but also the indifferent and ineffective rule of Puerto Rico
by the U.S. colonial authorities. 4
U.S. involvement in the Caribbean increased in September of 1940 after
the Lend-Lease agreement with Britain, which involved the transfer of fifty
destroyers to the Royal Navy in exchange for the right to build bases on British
colonial territories. Air and naval facilities were built in Jamaica, Bahamas,
Antigua, St. Lucia, Trinidad and British Guyana. These bases secured all
entrances to the Caribbean, with the installations at Chaguaramas in Trinidad
considered the most important due to their proximity to the vital bauxite and oil

.
)

resources from northern South America and the Dutch islands of Aruba and
Cura~ao.
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On September 19, 1941 President Roosevelt appointed Rexford G. Tugwell
as governor of Puerto Rico. Tugwell had earlier expressed to President

I

Roosevelt his concerns at the social situation of the Caribbean, and in particular

j

of the U.S. treatment of Puerto Rico. Socioeconomic reform became the

'

j

I

l•

common thread that bound together Tugwell and Munoz Marin. They both
sought to remove the injustices of the past colonial administrations. Altruism
aside, correcting economic exploitation was of utmost importance in securing
Puerto Rico as a part of the U.S. war effort. Tugwell fit well the need for
someone who could add administrative experience to strategic concern.
When Tugwell became governor, Munoz Marin had already begun enacting his
campaign agenda. Most important was the creation of an Autoridad de Tierras
(Land Authority) empowered to purchase lands held in excess of the 500-acre
• Rexford G. Tugwell, The Stricken Land. (New York, Greenwood Press, 1946), 64-79.
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limitation. Farm wages would include proportionate shares of the profit, and
land would be redistributed to peasant families. Also, the PPD set in motion the
basis for a reformed civil service, and the increased role of the government in
the economic and social development of the island. The sudden rush of public
initiative and power created deep resentment among the conservative elements
of society. The Coalici6n, despite their power, could not stop the legislation.
Their leadership maintained that the new legislation was both leftist and rightist,
and that the governor was supporting the PPD in an effort to build a personal
dictatorship. 5 Tugwell's anti-New Deal enemies in the United States joined the
chorus, and in 1943, congressional committees sent subcommittees to the
island to find out was was happening.
In February, 1943, Tugwell stated his case before the Senate
Subcommittee on Territories and Insular Affairs, headed by Senator Dennis
Chaves of New Mexico. 6 If his support of the Puerto Rican urge for
reconstruction indicated "an imperfect understanding of a colonial governor's
duties," Congress had also been at fault; for the Jones Act assigned duties "in
controlling this possession to others than the governor." This act, he held, had
the inherent quality of all older approaches to colonialism in that the home
government reserves the right to prescribe what a people cannot do, because if
they were free, they would do something unwise. 1 Since the act had been in
force for twenty-six years, why had the United States failed to move decisively in
reviewing the demands for political reform coming from the island? "Two million
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people" he stated "cannot permanently be kept in the twilight colonialism. "9
According to Tugwell, the infighting, divisionism and increasing
radicalization of the political process in Puerto Rico could be traced back to the
U.S. Congress' unwillingness to provide a clear policy regarding the future of
the island. The U.S. was neither preparing the island for statehood or
independence, nor proposing to modify the Jones Act in order to grant more
autonomy in order that the people of Puerto Rico could effectively work to
improve their own situation. The legislature of Puerto Rico, in his opinion, was
under the tutelage of Congress, and Congress had to decide whether to move
towards independence or to grant greater autonomy. In either case, the United
States was responsible for creating conditions for its success. He advocated an
immediate modification of the Jones Act to provide for an elective governor, as
this would reduce the power of the political parties and provide leadership to
the legislature. 0
The likelihood of political reforms had to be taken in the context of the
current war situation. Since the Japanese attack on the military installations at
Pearl Harbor in Hawaii in late 1941 , the Axis armed forces had inflicted heavy
losses on the U.S. The Japanese now occupied the U.S. Pacific territories of
the Philippines, Guam and Wake Island and they were threatening Alaska with
invasion. At the same time German U-Boats were inflicting heavy losses on
merchant vessels plying the sea lanes of the Caribbean and the Mid-Atlantic.
With the island effectively under blockade from the German submarines, 10 and
the U.S. military buildup in Puerto Rico barely getting under way, there was
Morales Carri6n, Puerto Rico. 252.
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the distinct possibility that internal unrest might erupt.
Governor Tugwell was most concerned with the activities of the large and
influential Spanish community in the island. There were an estimated six
thousand Spanish citizens, many of them residents of Puerto Rico at the time of
the Spanish-American War of 1898 who refused to accept U.S. citizenship in
1917 when the Jones Act came into effect. This community had many interests
in business and commerce, and in general supported the Fascist regime of
General Franco in Spain. 11
While officially neutral, the Franco regime, which controlled Spain since
1939 after defeating the democratically-elected Spanish Republican
government in the Civil War, actively assisted the Axis powers. Franco had sent
troops (mostly members of the Falange, the Spanish Fascist party) to participate
in the German invasion of the Soviet Union, and also provided bases for the UBoats. Of more immediate concern were the activities of the overseas branch of
the Falange, as the Germans were allowed to use this network of Franco
sympathizers to gather intelligence throughout Latin America. 12
In Puerto Rico the local Falange branch was under surveillance by the
authorities, and in 1941 the members accepted outwardly the dissolution of the
organization. However, the Falangistas remained committed to the return of the
island to Spain as a prelude of the rebirth of the Spanish Empire in the
Americas. This, combined with their strong rejection of the imposition of U.S.
social, political and cultural values on people of Spanish stock, such as Puerto
Ricans, raised the possibility that elements of the banished Nacionalista
movement might be attracted to the Falange agenda. The U.S. could hardly
11
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afford the disruption to their operation in the Caribbean that would occur if, due
to combination of economic hardship and lack of political freedoms, the people
of Puerto Rico would join a German-supported Nacionalista revolt.
Both Tugwell and Munoz Marfn realized that the war-time scarcity and
isolation would make it even more difficult to find solutions to the problems of
the island. They outlined the measures that needed to be taken in Puerto Rico.
They insisted on the need for agricultural improvement, for industrialization, and
for a policy to supersede the old colonialism. An elective governor was a
beginning, as had been suggested by the appointed Tugwell. The long period
of inaction in Congress should come to an end, and the Puerto Rican electorate
must be allowed to express itself. 13
The war generated problems, but also opportunities. The drive for reform
and reconstruction created a new sense of purpose and reduced the clashes
between the executive and the legislative branches. Federal expenditures
helped the economy. Income directly traceable to war activities of the federal
government rose from $8. 1 million in 1940 to $106.4 million in 1944. 14 The rum
and tobacco industries also benefited from the absence of competition from
Europe. In particular, the U.S. liquor market proved to be a bonanza for Puerto
Rican rum producers. In five years, their net income rose from $1.6 million to
$14.3 million. Another improvement was the diversification of the economic
base, as manufacturing was becoming relatively more important than in
previous years. Finally, by late 1943 the German U-Boats were becoming less
effective in disrupting the flow of shipping into the Caribbean, this due mostly to
the increase in U.S. and Allied naval and air power in the region.
13
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By 1944 the military situation looked more favorable to the U.S. and the
island's economy slowly but steadily improved. Munoz Marfn and the PPD
looked forward to the coming elections. A convincing electoral victory would not
only allow the Populares to accelerate their social and economic plans, but
would also give them greater authority in their future attempts to seek greater
autonomy. The PPD maintained that the status was not an issue for them in the
elections, but had pledged to wait until after the end of the war to conduct a
referendum.
During the elections of 1944, the PPD obtained an extraordinary victory that
included the absolute control of the legislature for the first time. 15 The Populares
controlled all the seats in the Senado. and thirty four of the thirty five seats in the
Camara

de Representantes. The preponderance of the PPD established with

this election would last until 1968. 16
From 1943 to 1945, several projects were presented in Congress, at the
urging of Governor Tugwell, to reform the political and administrative framework
of the island. 11 One of these bills, S.952, proposed the independence of the
island and was initially backed by the PPD. However, despite the realization
that the status quo needed to be changed, concern over the fate of U.S. military
installations weighted heavily against granting independence to Puerto Rico. At
the hearings for this bill, the Assistant Secretary of War stated that from a
military point of view "it would be easier if we had sovereignty over any area, to
make our military dispositions over the area". 18 Senator Robert A. Taft expressed
15
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that the best alternative would be "to consider also the question of some kind of
autonomous government under which we would retain control of foreign
relations and military control of the island. I think the (War) department, in
making their general study of this question, might consider whether that
condition was not more consistent with the military needs than complete
independence ... "19 The Senator also recognized that the demands similar to
those of the people of Puerto Rico for more self-government "may be repeated
hundredfold all over the world after the war, in the post-war settlement... Many
islands throughout the world will have semi-autonomous status. This is only
one phase of the problem ... "20
President Roosevelt was persuaded by Tugwell 's arguments and
supported reforming the government of Puerto Rico, but in such a manner that
the U.S. military presence would not be compromised. In a message to the
House Committee on Insular Affairs, Pres. Roosevelt outlined the position of his
administration regarding the future political situation of the island:
During the 45 years of our sovereignty (over Puerto Rico), the elements of
world military and naval strategy have changed also. When the island was
brought under our flag, the Panama Canal had not yet been dug, and the
airplane had not yet been invented. The Caribbean was something of a
backwater in the broad current of world affairs. When the present war became
imminent, however, it was obvious that the chain of islands running in a great
arc from Florida to the shoulder of South America, enclosing the Caribbean
Sea, formed a vast natural shield for the Panama Canal. .. And of this island
shield, Puerto Rico is the center. Its possession or control by any foreign
power -or even the remote threat of such a possession- would be repugnant
to the most elementary principles of national defense.
It has long been the policy of the Government of the United States
progressively to reinforce the machinery of self-government in its territories
and island possessions. The principles for which we are now fighting require
that of all our citizens -whether continental or overseas- to the greatest
possible degree of home rule and also of participation in the benefits and
responsibilities of our Federal system.
Puerto Ricans of all political parties, however divergent their views as to the
'
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political future of the island, are united in asking for the right to elect their own
Governor. I believe that they are entitled to it... The fiscal relationship of the
insular government to the Federal Government would not be altered, nor
would the ultimate power of Congress to legislate for the Territory. 21
Congress failed to act on any of the proposed bills, but the hearings had
served as way to discuss the possible alternatives for reform in Puerto Rico.
Clearly, the interest of the military in maintaining their presence on the island
was the overriding factor for the United States. Both Congress and President
Roosevelt believed that independence would interfere with the unimpeded use
of the island by the military, but also realized that the current administrative
situation was intolerable to most Puerto Ricans. Statehood was out of the
question because there was no support for it either in Washington (few in
Congress were willing to accept an economically depressed territory as a state,
much less one with different language, culture and ethnic composition), or in
Puerto Rico (where the majority party, the PPD was still officially proindependence). Some type of autonomy emerged as the only viable alternative
to the problem of the status. At the end of World War II, the U.S. was ready to
act Sensing this change in political climate, Tugwell decided to hasten the
process of reform by announcing in December of 1945, his intent to resign from
the governorship expecting that President Harry S. Truman (who succeeded
Roosevelt after the latter's death earlier in 1945) would appoint a Puerto Rican
to the post.
On July 25, 1946, President Truman took a momentous step forward in
U.S.-Puerto Rican relations. He appointed the first Puerto Rican ever, Jesus T.
Pinero, as Governor of the island. Ten months later, on May 2, 1947,
21
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Representative Fred L. Crawford of Michigan, introduced legislation to make the
governorship of Puerto Rico an elective office. 22 The U.S. government was
beginning to implement the first basic reforms that Tugwell and Munoz Marfn
had requested since 1941. On August 5, 1947, President Truman signed this
bill, Public Law 362, that also provided for the Puerto Rican Governor to name
all the Secretaries for the Cabinet with the advice and consent of the Insular
Senate. 23 Another important part of this law was the creation of the position of
"Coordinator of Federal Agencies in Puerto Rico", a functionary appointed by
the President and confirmed by the U.S. Senate, to supervise the administration
of Federal programs in the island. Clearly, the intention was to retain a measure
of control from Washington at the same time that greater autonomy was
conceded to the island.
At this time, however, the PPD had to resolve an internal debate between
the proponents of independence and those of autonomy. Munoz Marfn himself
had undergone a transformation in his philosophical approach to the status
question. In 1938 he left the Partido Liberal after it abandoned the ideal of
independence. Ten years later Gilberto Concepcion de Gracia (a Popular
leader who had initially followed Albizu Campos) threatened to do the same to
the PPD. Concepcion de Gracia pressed Munoz Marin to reiterate that
independence remained the official goal of the party, but Munoz Marfn replied
that he was more concerned with solving the problems of the island and the
status issue realistically. The pro-independence wing of the PPD then split and
formed, on October 27, 1946, the Partido lndependentista Puertorriqueno
22
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(Puerto Rican Independence Party), or PIP
Although Munoz Madn was formerly a staunch defender of independence
for the island, his close association with Governor Tugwell and the latter's
commitment toward improving the situation of Puerto Ricans, plus the
realization that with enough prodding (even after the previous failures of
Congress to do something), the United States would eventually act on behalf of
the island, convinced Munoz Marfn that some sort of autonomy within the Union
would allow Puerto Rico to achieve a greater measure of self-government, while
at the same time retaining economic benefits derived from free access to U.S.
markets and Federal aid grants. 24
In June of 1946 Munoz Marf n first openly discussed his new approach
regarding the future status of the island in a series of articles published in the
Puerto Rican daily El Mundo. 25 He considered that the changes in the world
since the end of World War 11 meant that a new evaluation be made of the option
available to the country. Emphasizing the interdependency of the world,
especially of the democratic West led by the United States, he maintained that
complete sovereignty was no longer needed as a tool to improve the condition
of a people. Munoz Marfn was convinced that any future status should be
considered principally by how the people would benefit in practice. Munoz
Marfn was convinced that the economic and social situation of the island made
statehood impossible, and that independence without special bilateral
arrangements (unlikely to be granted by Congress) would also be impossible.
As leader of the PPD Munoz Marfn would very likely become the first
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elected governor of the island, after the election of 1948. By his clever
separation for practical purposes of the issues of autonomy and the final
political status of Puerto Rico, he managed to gather the support of Congress on
the bills granting more self-government to the island. The attitude in Congress
was one of paternalistic concern for the administration of Puerto Rico with the
comfortable knowledge that ultimate control over the island still remained in
Washington. U.S. officials and Munoz Marfn realized that the elective governor
measure was but a first step down the road of greater reforms and changes
concerning the relationship between the island and the United States.
In November 1948 the PPD, as anticipated, won the election by a wide
margin. Lufs Munoz Marfn became the first elected governor of Puerto Rico,
and now would have the opportunity to elaborate on his concept of autonomy.
Even if the Populares had wanted to sidestep the issue of the status in this
election, the other political parties kept it alive. The pro-statehood forces
gathered under the new Partido Republicano Estadista (Statehood Republican
Party) and its leader the wealthy industrialist Luf s A. Ferre. At the same time,
the pro-independence PIP, under Concepci6n de Gracia, entered their first
electoral contest.
Because the status question remained the focus of Puerto Rican politics,
the PPD defined precisely their new autonomous alternative. Munoz Marfn
insisted that:
The people of Puerto Rico should authorize with their votes the following
request: that the Congress of the United states by law fulfills the selfgoverning of Puerto Rico to the utmost without becoming a State within the
constitutional structure of the United states. That is, that the people of Puerto
Rico be authorized to make its own constitution, in the same fashion that new
States are authorized; that the economic relations between Puerto Rico and
the United States continue essentially the same ... This will establish the
largest possible measure of self-government that some times under the name
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of autonomy, some times under the name of Dominion, some times under
other names, has been one of the solutions proposed through history in
Puerto Rico. 26
The proposal for such a status was offered to Congress early in 1950. The
bill now under consideration would replace the Jones Act by a new document
reaffirming the economic interdependence of Puerto Rico and the United
States, and the Federal jurisdiction of several areas of government ( for
example, defense, currency, coastal shipping, immigration). Also, the island
would continue to have only the non-voting Resident Commissioner as
representative to Congress, but in return no Federal taxes would be levied.
Fern6s lsern, the Resident Commissioner of Puerto Rico in Washington, worked
in Congress to get the support needed for the realization of the constitutional
goal. The proposed bill, H.R. 7674, recognized the principle of government by
consent and stated that its passage would be regarded as having been adopted
in the nature of a compact between the peoples of Puerto Rico and the United
States. 21 This settled the basic characteristics of the Constitution that would then
be drafted and presented for ratification to the people of Puerto Rico.
By July of 1950 both the Senate and the House, after reaching agreement
on the bill, presented it to the President for his signature. On July 3, 1950,
President Truman signed the bill into Public Law 600. 28 As part of this package,
a referendum was expected to be held on July of 1951 .
U.S. defense strategists were concerned with the future of the many military

26

Speech given by Lurs Munoz Marrn during the acts of commemoration of the
independence of the United States, on July 4, 1948. In Seij6 Bruno, La insurrecci6n nacionalista.
37.
21
U.S. Congress, House, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 81st Cong., 2nd sess., H.R. 7674,
Congressional Record, 13 March 1950, H3260.
25
Fern6s lsern, Estado Libre Asociado, 108-109.

54
installations in Puerto Rico. Indeed, Ramey Air Force Base in Aguadilla,
Roosevelt Roads Naval Station in Ceiba and the Atlantic Fleet target range and
practice area on Vieques Island were regarded as key and irreplaceable. 29
These bases had proven their value during World War II against the German
submarines that preyed on Allied shipping in the area, and they would continue
to be important against any possible Soviet threat to the Panama Canal and the
Caribbean Sea trade routes. This strategic value is further reflected by the fact
that the U.S. military requested expansion and modernization of existing
facilities on the island. In the words of Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal:
(i)n developing its post-war plans, the Navy Department has found it
necessary to give careful consideration to the requirements of the Atlantic
Fleet for adequate training areas in the Caribbean area, particularly for
amphibious operations and firing practice. Its studies demonstrate
conclusively that this area will assume great strategic importance in the postwar era ...
3()

Military leaders must have been satisfied that the political changes taking
place on the island would not impair their activities. In a period of heightened
security-consciousness, many legislators in Congress were reassured that the
Navy and Army holdings and operations would remain unaffected on an island
that guarded the entrance to the Caribbean.
While these discussion were taking place in Washington, new
developments in Puerto Rico would dramatize the urgency for political reform.
The leader of the Nacionalistas, Pedro Albizu Campos, after serving his ten
year sentence in Federal prison, was freed and returned to a much changed
island on December 15, 1947. He immediately set out to reorganize the party
29
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and to confront Munoz Marfn for the latter's abandonment of the ideal of
independence. Albizu Campos also denounced the process initiated by the
Public Law 600 as just the continuation of the same U.S. colonial control of the
island under another guise. 31
The Partido Nacionalista announced that it would not participate on the
scheduled referendum, but while rejecting any further pro-independence
political action, Albizu Campos was determined to achieve independence
through revolutionary action. On October 29, 1950, he launched a general
uprising against the Insular Government. The plan called for the Nacionalistas
to stage a series of coordinated attacks on police stations and other government
buildings across the island. Due to the fact that the police had infiltrated
I

informants among the Nacionalistas, and since the party lacked training,
organization and weapons, only a few groups actually carried out their orders.
In the towns of Arecibo, Penuelas and Jayuya the Nacionalistas were easily
repulsed. An attempt to storm La Fortaleza (the official governor's residence),
and assassinate Munoz Marfn also failed after a fierce gun battle that left four
Nacionalistas dead. 32 Governor Munoz Marfn ordered the National Guard into
action, but he did not request Federal troops. The largest action of the revolt
took place in the town of Utuado. Albizu Campos planned to hold out in this
small and inaccessible mountain village for at least a month, convinced that
protests from countries opposed to colonialism at the United Nations would
force the United States to grant the island independence. 33 As it was, the shortlived revolt was crushed by November 2. Albizu Campos was captured and
31
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eventually sentenced again to federal prison in the United States. One last
incident, that captured world-wide attention, was the attempt on the life of
President Truman. During the attack on the Blair House, used temporarily by
Truman as his official residence, one Nacionalista and one presidential guard
were killed. 34
The insurrection did not impede the political dialogue between the U.S.
and Governor Munoz Marfn. The rapid and efficient suppression of the unrest
by the local authorities made it clear that Albizu Campos and the Partido
Nacionalista were a small discontented minority. Also the fact that Munoz Marfn
himself was a target reaffirmed his own prestige as a moderate who was firmly
committed to democracy and thus perceived as an enemy by the anti-U.S forces
in the island. In fact, Congress seemed more determined than ever speed up
the resolution of the status question, particularly since the unrest in Puerto Rico
came at the same time as the start of the Korean Conflict in June of 1950, which
worsened tensions between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.
The U.S. was determined to stop the expansion of the Soviet-supported
communist regime of North Korea after the latter's invasion of the South, and at
the same time deter the Soviets from further military aggression in Asia and
elsewhere. It was determined that since, at least for the moment, the possibility
of a world war was low the defense of the Caribbean was less important than
the reinforcing of the U.S. troops engaged in Korea. Part of the ensuing build-up
included the all-Puerto Rican 65th Infantry Regiment, that joined the action on
September of 1950. The many commendations and awards earned by this unit
also served to reassure the U.S. military, after the Nacionalista revolt, of the
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dependability of Puerto Ricans serving in the armed forces. 35
On June 4, 1951, Puerto Ricans went to the polls and approved the
referendum to select a Constituent Assembly in charge of drafting a constitution.
Less than a year latter, on March 3, 1952, the final document was endorsed by
the people of Puerto Rico. This constitution created a new relationship between
the United States and Puerto Rico, significantly different from the past
arrangements under the Foraker and Jones Act. Apart from incorporating
previously granted reforms, such as the elected governorship, the new
arrangement provided for the establishment of an Estado Libre Asociado (Free
Associated State), or Commonwealth based on a "compact" between the
people of Puerto Rico and Congress. The definition of the Commonwealth then
was that of special association with the United States, 38 that did not preclude
future changes. The government of Puerto Rico could then negotiate with
Congress the application of federal laws and regulations on the island. A
common citizenship would provide the basic link with the United States.
However, even as the Commonwealth was hailed by the PPD as the best
possible instrument to achieve both political self-determination and improve the
economy of the island, Munoz Marin should have realized that the old Carta
Auton6mica negotiated between his father and the Spanish government
granted more autonomy to the island than this new constitution. The provisions
of the Carta Auton6mica, could only be changed with the approval of the Insular
legislature. The Puerto Rican legislature, however, could modify laws passed
by the Spanish Parliament to better reflect the conditions in the island. While
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the Gobernador-General (Governor) was still appointed by the Spanish Crown,
his functions were designed largely toward overseeing the readiness of the
military. Since he lacked veto power, the Gobernador-General could do very
little to oppose laws enacted by the autonomic government, except request
arbitration by the Council of Ministers of the Kingdom. The Autonomic
Government of 1897 led by Lufs Munoz Rivera had also the power to negotiate
trade agreements with other countries, to control the territorial waters of the
island, to raise revenue through the levy of duties on imports (Spanish as well
as foreign) and exports, and to issue currency. Lastly, Puerto Ricans, as
Spanish citizens, could also elect representatives to the Cortes on an equal
footing with the rest of Spain.
Under the Commonwealth, the Puerto Rican legislature could not make
laws in areas specifically allotted to the Congress in Washington under the U.S.
Constitution. Thus the making of treaties with other countries, the power to
regulate commerce between the island and the United States and the rest of the
world, control of the territorial waters, immigration, issuance of currency, plus
matters of defense and the military, all remained under the direct control of the
U.S. Federal government. Moreover, all laws (including the Constitution of the
Commonwealth) could be rescinded or altered unilaterally by the U.S.
Congress. The Commonwealth retained from the Jones Act, as only
representative before Congress, the position of the Resident Commissioner in
Washington. The Resident Commissioner, as previously mentioned, could not
vote or present legislation even on matters that have a direct impact on the
island. Without full participation in Congress, however, Puerto Ricans are
exempt from paying Federal taxes. This was also extended to corporations
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doing business in Puerto Rico (section 936 of the Internal Revenue Act), 37
providing a strong incentive for U.S. corporations to relocate their production
facilities to the island.
After Congress approved of the new constitution, Gov. Munoz Marrn
proclaimed the Estado Libre Asociado on July 25, 1952 (the fifty-fourth
anniversary of the U.S. invasion of the island during the Spanish-American War
in 1898). The reaction of Congress was very enthusiastic regarding the efforts
for self-government made by Puerto Ricans. However, influential groups who
endorsed the measure did so in the knowledge that Congress retained the right
to decide Puerto Rico's final political status. This attitude combined with a
paternalistic sense of responsibility was reflected in comments made by
Congressman Walter H. Judd of Minnesota:" ... you cannot expect to take a
child in the third grade or sixth grade and move him up into a postgraduate
school without the various grades between. "38
The fact is that Puerto Rican politicians had a long history of dealings with
metropolitan colonial governments going back to the drafting of the first
Constitution of the Kingdom of Spain in 1812, to the 1897 Carta Auton6mica
granted by Spain just before the Spanish-American War, and also the relations
during the first fifty years of U.S. rule. Therefore, this practical experience had
more than prepared Puerto Rico and the Puerto Ricans to manage their own
internal affairs. Also, a careful comparison of the powers granted to Puerto Rico
under the Commonwealth reveals that they are not as extensive as those
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provided by the Carta Auton6mica. However, just as Luf s Munoz Rivera had
done in 1896, his son Muiioz Marf n had seized the opportunity afforded by
concerns with international events in the ruling colonial power. The autonomic
arrangements obtained by both father and son constituted great advances in
the quest for political and economic self-determination for the people of Puerto
Rico.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
Following the adoption of the Estado Libre Asociado, Governor Munoz
Marin asked President Eisenhower that no additional reports on the condition of
the island be sent to the United Nations Trusteeship Council, arguing that
Puerto Rico now enjoyed self-government and a wide range of autonomy. On
November 27, 1953, the General Assembly agreed with the U.S. position that
Puerto Rico was no longer a dependent territory, 1 and the annual reports were
discontinued.
The new political status, however, failed to provide a definitive alternative
for all groups on the island. Supporters of both statehood and independence,
realizing that the Commonwealth formula was specifically designed so it could

be modified or superseded by another, continued their political activities. Due
to the immense prestige of Luis Munoz Marin, however, the PPD continues to be
the main party of Puerto Rico. 2
Since the 1950 Nacionalista uprising, however, the pro-independence
Partido lndependentista Puertorrigueno, sponsoring the peaceful transition to
full sovereignty, has gained wide acceptance among some sectors of society.
University students, young professionals and second generation Puerto Ricans
living in the continental U.S. oppose statehood and have become disillusioned
with Commonwealth as a permanent solution. 3 More radical groups, such as the
Ejercito Popular Boricua (Popular "Boricua" Army), also known as Los
1
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Macheteros. have conducted a sporadic violent terrorist campaign against the
continued military presence of the United States. hoping that it would force the
U.S. to grant independence to Puerto Rico. Their first major operation was the
ambush of a group of U.S. Navy personnel on Sabana Seca on December of
1979. killing 2 and wounding several others. 4 Their most spectacular actions
included their attack in January of 1981 upon Muniz Air Base. near San Juan.
which resulted in· the destruction of A-7 jet fighters of the Puerto Rican Air
National Guard.5 and the robbery of seven million dollars from a Wells Fargo
armored car in Hartford. Connecticut (1983). A concerted effort by the F.B.I. and
the local police managed to disband the organization after a series of arrests
during 1985.
On the other end of the political spectrum. the pro-statehood party. the
Partido Nuevo Progresista (New Progressive Party) or PNP, eroded the PPD's
traditional support from the lower income groups. Four times. in 1968. 1976,
1980 and 1992. the PNP captured the governorship of the island. Also. the PNP
extracted promises of the acceptance of Puerto Rico as a State of the Union
from Presidents Ford. Reagan and Bush if the people of the island should vote
for that on a referendum.
The continued military and strategic importance of Puerto Rico was amply
demonstrated by the utilization of Puerto Rican bases in support of major
military actions in the Caribbean region. The rise to power in Cuba of Fidel
Castro on 1959 again focused the attention of the United States toward Latin
America and the Caribbean. The administrations of Presidents Kennedy and
Johnson were worried that the Soviet foothold in the Western Hemisphere
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would be just the beginning of a concerted Soviet-Cuban effort to destabilize
that part of the world. The U.S. intervention in the civil war then raging in the
Dominican Republic on April of 1965, simultaneous to the escalating U.S.
military involvement on the long-running war in Vietnam, was an expression of
this new policy of containment in Latin America. On that occasion Ramey Air
Force base in the northwestern part of Puerto Rico, was the key staging area for
the units of the 82nd Airborne Division that led the invasion force into Santo
Domingo, the capital of the Dominican Republic. 6 During the intervention on
Grenada on October of 1983, Roosevelt Roads Naval Station, near Ceiba in
eastern Puerto Rico, was used as a refueling stop, to stockpile supplies and
also as a base for sophisticated radar surveillance planes (E-3 AWACs) and F15 jet fighters whose mission was to intercept any airlift of reinforcements from
Cuba to Grenada. 1 The base in Roosevelt Roads was again used for refueling
and as casualty evacuation destination during the invasion of Panama on
December 20, 1989. 8
1.I

;:

The island of Vieques, off the east coast of Puerto Rico, is still the major
training area for the Navy and Marine forces in the Atlantic Fleet, that includes
over one hundred and fifty ships and six carrier air wings. Combined-arms
exercises and naval gunfire and aviation target practice are conducted on the
island throughout the year. 9 The mountain regions of the interior are routinely
utilized as "jungle" training facilities for U.S. Special Forces, Marines and the
Puerto Rican National Guard, as well as by the forces of allied countries such as
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the Netherlands, Britain, Brazil and Venezuela. ' 0
The value of Vieques to the operations of the U.S. Navy was described by
Vice-Admiral T.J. Bigley, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, on September
12, 1978 as follows:
The strategic importance of Vieques is mainly in its geographic location
and the prepositioned ammunition stocks needed in support of Navy and
Marine Corps deployed units. If the use of the Vieques Ammunition Facility
were denied, logistics flexibility to support operational units would be
unacceptably restricted. 11
This view was also echoed by the former commander of the U.S. forces in the
Caribbean, Rear Admiral Arthur Knoizen on January 18, 1979 during an
interview with a newspaper from the region:
We need to stay here in the Caribbean and continue our training. Vieques
is a key part of our operation. If you want national defense you have to keep
the Navy strong. Only if the Navy is strong will we be able to protect
[the United States]. 12

At the present time the main military bases and installations of the U.S.
armed forces in Puerto Rico were as follows: Roosevelt Roads Naval Station in
Ceiba, comprised of a complex of airfields, ammunition and supply stockpiles,
and repair facilities to support the operations of the Atlantic Fleet; Camp Garcfa
training grounds in Vieques, used for "wargames" during amphibious landing
operations; Sabana Seca, communications and radar warning site in western
Puerto Rico; Camp Tortuguero, training and maneuvers site along the northern
coast between San Juan and Arecibo; Salinas Training Center, a large land-air
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training facility used now mostly by the Puerto Rican National Guard; Ramey
Field (Punta Borinquen), a large air base formerly used by the Strategic Air
Command to house B-52 bomber airplanes. The Air Force retired the planes
and turned the base over to the government of Puerto Rico in 1973, but its
installations are still used by the Puerto Rican National Guard, the U.S. Coast
Guard, and at times by the U.S. Navy; and the Barrio Guerrero Naval
Communication Station in lsabela, a complex of radio antennae and electronic
equipment used by the Navy to enhance the communications capabilities
between the ships of the Atlantic Fleet and their I Ieadquarters in the United
States. 13 The Caribbean National Forest, a park under the jurisdiction of the
U.S. Interior Department, was also used during the 1960's as testing ground for
defoliants such as "Agent Orange" latter used during the Vietnam War.
The political situation of Puerto Rico, in the end, has remained basically
unchanged since the U.S. took over the island. The major political and fiscal
issues must still be cleared through Washington before any decision is
implemented by the local authorities. Meanwhile the U.S. military presence
continues to be very much in evidence and the social, economic and
psychological links between the island and the mainland are strongly imprinted
on the population of Puerto Rico.
The decision of the Truman administration to grant political autonomy to the
island in response to the rising nationalist sentiments and the pressing need for
political reform evident in the island immediately after the end of World War 11
has paid off handsomely for the U.S. This action defused the issue of the
United States posing as the world-wide defender of democracy while at the
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same time denying self-government to the more than two million Puerto Ricans
in 1950. Also, a smooth transition to a reform government, under a popular
leader, was accomplished without any major complication (excepting the 1950
Nacionalista uprising) and thus guaranteed the permanency and availability of
U.S. military installations on the island.
The credit for the development of the Estado Libre Asociado lies. of course,
with Lufs Munoz Marfn. He alone among the major political figures in Puerto
Rico had the vision to recognize that the island needed first to rebuild its
economic base and start the process of resolving the many pressing social
ailments of the country. For him, any serious consideration cannot be given to
either full integration into the U.S. as a state, or full sovereignty as an
independent country until the critical problems of poverty, malnutrition and
unemployment were dealt with. After serving as governor from 1948 to 1964,
Munoz Marfn retired from active politics, leaving the field open for a new
generation of leaders in the PPD. Lufs Munoz Marfn died on April 30, 1980,
after realizing his dream for prosperity through autonomy.
The current political prospects for the island are not clear. A non-binding
referendum held on November 14, 1993 by the new PNP administration of
Governor Pedro Roseli6 resulted in an extremely close vote in support of
sending a delegation to negotiate with Congress the improvement of the current
Commonwealth through the granting of more powers and the inclusion of the
island on additional assistance programs. The voting results, 48.5 % for
Commonwealth, 46 % for statehood and 5% for independence 14 also indicate
that while the overwhelming majority of Puerto Ricans support a continued
political link with the U.S., there is a lack of consensus on whether autonomy or
1
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statehood would provide the best vehicle for a such a relationship. Any move
toward either an "improved" Commonwealth or statehood would require the
support of a significant majority of Puerto Ricans in order to be approved by
Congress. It also raises the question of how to integrate a people whose
language is not English, with a very different cultural and racial heritage, and
who had demonstrated a great resilience in protecting their national character
in opposition to the assimilist policies of the colonial administrations of the past.
Contributing to the changing political picture of Puerto Rico is the end of the
Cold War. This has reduced considerably the need for the U.S. to maintain
large numbers of military forces deployed arour.d the world and also in the
Caribbean. The collapse of the Soviet Union contributed to the end of the civil
wars in El Salvador and Nicaragua, and led to a considerable weakening of
Fidel Castro's regime in Cuba. Without a clear threat to it's security and interest
in the Caribbean Basin region, the United States could conceivable decide in
the near future that the fiscal expense of supporting the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico is greater than any real benefit derived from this mutual
relationship. However, it is important to point out that even without the menace
of foreign military aggression or political infiltration, the U.S. would always need
to remain involved in the Caribbean and Latin America.
The recent massive exodus of Haitian refugees fleeing their country and
requesting political asylum in the United States, due to repressive policies of
the military junta that deposed the democratically-elected government of Jean
Betrand Aristide in 1991, is but one example of the type of local instability that
might require the utilization of U.S. military power in the region. The advantage
for the United States of freedom of access to the military and logistical facilities
in the island for this type of situations was demonstrated in September of 1980,
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when President Carter faced a much smaller influx of Haitian boat people
escaping the dictatorship of "Baby Doc" Duvalier. Hundreds of Haitians were
sent to the Ft. Allen, a formerly mothballed army base in southern Puerto Rico,
while their asylum claims were evaluated. 15 For the administration it was much
safer to send the refugees here, as Puerto Ricans cannot vote in presidential
elections and lack effective representation in Congress, than to cope with the
domestic opposition that was bound to arise due to the unpopularity of admitting
Haitians into the United States. The most recent instance of the usefulness of
Puerto Rico for the U.S. military took place during October and November of
1994. Several bases were reactivated to serve as training centers for troops
from Jamaica, Barbados and other Caribbean island-nations that were to be
part of the peace-keeping forces sent to Haiti in support of President Aristide
after the military junta was deposed by the U.S. intervention in October of 1994.
Also the military installations in Puerto Rico are currently involved in the
efforts to interdict the traffic of drugs coming from South America into the United
States. The relative proximity of the Colombian coast plus the fact that
passenger and cargo traveling between Puerto Rico and the mainland is
exempt from customs inspection, translates into an increase in smuggling
activities. 16
The economic picture of the island clearly reflects the rapid development
that r1as taken place since 1952. Puerto Rico is the world's 10th largest
purchaser of goods and services from the United States. Manufacturing
accounts for 41 % of the island's $34 billion Gross Domestic Product. Puerto
15
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Rico's major industries include chemicals, textiles and electronic equipment,
and rs currently the world's largest producer of pharmaceuticals. Tourism
comprise about 6% of the Gross Domestic Product. Meanwhile the traditional
agricultural production of sugar cane, coffee, bananas and pineapples has
(

diminished to secondary importance. 11
The geographical situation of the island is the constant factor that has made
Puerto Rico an important player in the political and strategic events of the
Caribbean for close to five-hundred years. First fortified by Spain to provide
security to the galleon fleets in the sixteen century, the island location proved
still equally useful to the United States in combating German submarines during
World War II, supporting military interventions in neighboring countries during
the Cold War and in confronting the new problems of enforcing U.S. laws

.

against undocumented immigration and illegal drug traffic.
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The continued political stability of this key island, achieved with the
implementation of the self-governing commonwealth status in 1952, is
something that cannot be ignored by those nations who consider vital to their
interests a policy of engagement in the affairs of the region.

11

Puerto Rico Federal Affairs Administration, Puerto Rico Overview. (Washington, D.C.:
Government of Puerto Rico, 1994), 1-3.

70
APPENDIX 1

CARTA AUTONOMICA
(AUTONOMIC CHARTER)1
ROYAL DECREE
Upon the proposition of my Prime Minister, and with the concurrence of the
Council of Ministers in the name of My August Son, King Alfonso XIII, and as Queen
Regent of the Kingdom, I hereby decree as follows:
TITLEI
Government and Administration of the Island of Puerto Rico.
Article 1 . The island of Puerto Rico shall hereafter be governed and
administered in conformity with the following provisions.
Article 2. The island shall be governed by an Insular Parliament, consisting of
two chambers, and by the Governor-General, representing the mother country, who
shall exercise supreme authority.
TITLEII
The Insular Chambers.
Article 3. The insular chambers, together with the Governor-General, shall have
power to legislate concerning colonial affairs in the manner and on the terms provided
by law.
Article 4. Insular representation shall consist of two bodies of equal powers,
which shall be known as Chamber of Representatives and Council of Administration.
TITLE Ill
Council of Administration.
Article 5. The Council shall be composed of fifteen members, of whom eight
shall be elected in the manner directed by the electoral law, and seven shall be
designated by the Governor-General acting for the Crown, from among such persons
as have the qualifications specified in the following articles:
Article 6. To be entitled to sit in the Council of Administration it is necessary to
be a Spanish subject; to have attained the age of thirty-five years; to have been born
on the island, or to have had four years' constant residence therein; not to be subject
to any pending criminal prosecution; to be in the full enjoyment of his political rights; to
1
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have his property free from attachment; to have had for two or more years previous an
annual income of four thousand pesos; to have no interest in any contract with either
the insular of the home Government.
The shareholders of a stock company shall not be considered as government
contractors, even if the company has a contract with the Government.
Article 7. Persons who are also qualified to serve as councilors who, beside the
above-stated requirements, have any of the following qualifications:
1. To be or to have been a senator of the Kingdom, or to possess the requirements
for being a Senator, in conformity with Article Ill of the Constitution.
2. To have held for a period of two years any of the following offices: President or
prosecuting attorney of the Territorial Audiencia (Court) of Puerto Rico; Director of the
lnstituto de San Juan: Councilor of Administration in the Council formerly thus
designated: President of the Chambers of Commerce of San Juan and Ponce;
President of the Economic Society of Friends of the Country of Puerto Rico; President
of the Agriculturalists' Association: Dean of the Illustrious Bar of San Juan; Mayor of
San Juan or President of the Provincial Assembly during two terms: Dean of chapter of
the cathedral.
3. Likewise may be elected or appointed any property-owner from the fifty taxpayers
paying the highest taxes, either on real state or on industries, commerce, arts, and the
professions.
Article 8. The Councilors appointed by the Crown shall be appointed by special
decrees, stating the qualifications entitling the appointee to serve as Councilor.
Councilors thus appointed shall hold office for life.
One-half the number of the elective Councilors shall be elected every five years, and
the whole number shall be elected whenever the Council of Administration shall be
dissolved by the Governor-General.
Article 9. The qualifications required in order to be appointed or elected
Councilor of Administration may be changed by a national law at the request or upon
proposition of the Insular Chambers.
Article 1o. No councilor shall, during the session of the Council, accept any civic
office, promotion (unless it be strictly by seniority), title, or decoration; but any councilor
may be appointed by either the local or the home Government to any commission
within his own profession or category, whenever the public service shall require it.
The secretaries of the insular Government shall be excepted from the foregoing rule.
TITLE IV
The Chamber of Representatives.

Article 11 . The Chamber of Representatives shall be composed of members
named by the electoral boards in the manner prescribed by law and in the proportion
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of one for every twenty-five thousand inhabitants.
Article 12. To be elected as Representative the candidate must have the
following requirements: To be a Spanish citizen, to be a layman, to have attained his
majority of age, to be in full enjoyment of civil rights, to have been born in the island or
to have had four years' constant residence therein, and not to be subject to any
pending criminal prosecution.
Aliticle 13. Representatives shall be elected every five years, and any
Representative may be re-elected any number of times.
Article 14. Any Representative upon whom either the local or home Government
shall confer a pension, or any employment, promotion (unless by strict seniority), paid
commission, title, or decoration, shall cease to be such without necessity of any
declaration to that effect, unless he shall within fifteen days of his appointment notify
the Chamber of his having declined the favor.
The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not include the Representatives
who shall be appointed members of the cabinet.
TITLEV
Proceedings of the Insular Chambers and Their Relations to Each Other.
Article 15. The Chambers will meet every year. The King, the Governor-General
acting in his name, shall convene, suspend, and adjourn the sessions and dissolve
the Chamber of Representatives and the Council of Administration, either separately
or simultaneously, under the obligation to call them together again or renew them
within three months.
Article 16. Each of the two legislative bodies shall determine the rules of their
proceedings and shall be the judges of the qualifications of their respective members
and the legality of their legislation.
Until the Chamber and the Council shall pass their own rules, they shall be governed
by the rules of the national House of Representatives and of the Senate, respectively.
Article 17. Each chamber shall choose its president, vice-president, and
secretaries.
Article 18. Neither chamber shall sit unless the other be sitting also, except
when the Council exercises judicial functions.
Article 19. The two insular chambers shall not deliberate together nor in the
presence of the Governor-General.
The sessions shall be public, but either chamber may hold secret sessions whenever
business of a private nature shall require it.
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Article 20. To the Governor-General, through his secretaries, as well as to either
of the chambers, belongs the power to initiate and propose colonial statutes.
Article 21. All colonial statutes in regard to taxes and the public credit shall
originate in the Chamber of Representatives.
, ,Article 22. Resolutions may be passed by either chamber by a plurality of votes;
but in order to pass a measure of a legislative character a majority of all the members
constituting the body must be present. Nevertheless, one-third of the members shall
constitute a quorum for deliberation.
Article 23. No resolution or law shall be considered passed by the Insular
Parliament unless it has had the concurrence of the Chamber of representatives and
the Council of Administration.
Article 24. Every colonial statute, as soon as it has been approved in the form
prescribed in the preceding article, shall be presented to the Governor-General by the
officers of both chambers for his sanction and proclamation of the same.
Article 25. Members of the Council and of the Chamber of Representatives shall
have immunity for any speech or vote in either chamber.
Article 26. No Councilor of Administration shall be indicted or arrested without a
previous resolution of the Council, unless he shall be found in fraganti or the Council
shall not be in session, but in every case notice shall be given to that body as soon as
possible, that it may determine what should be done. Nor shall the Representatives be
indicted or arrested during the sessions without the permission of the Chamber unless
they are found in fraganti, but in this last case. or in case of indictment or arrest when
the Chamber is not sitting, notice shall be given as soon as possible to the Chamber of
Representatives for its information and action. All proceedings against Councilors and
Representatives shall be brought before the Territorial Audiencia of Puerto Rico in the
cases and manner that shall be prescribed by the colonial statutes.
Article 27. The guarantees established in the foregoing section shall not apply
to a Councilor or Representative who shall himself admit that he is the author of any
article, book, pamphlet, or printed matter wherein military sedition is incited, or national
sovereignty is assailed.
Article 28. The relations between the two chambers shall be governed, unless
otherwise provided, by the act of July 19, 1837, regulating the relations between the
two legislative houses of the Cortes (national parliament).
Article 29. Besides the power of enacting laws for the colony the insular
chambers shall have power to:
1. To receive the oath of the Governor-General to preserve the Constitution and the

74
laws which guarantee the autonomy of the colony.
2. To enforce the responsibility of the secretaries of the executive, who shall be tried
by the Council, whenever impeached by the Chamber of Representatives.
3. To address the home Government though the Governor-General, proposing the
abrogation or modification of existing laws of the Kingdom; to invite the home
Government to present bills as to particular matters, or to ask a decision of an
executive character on matters which interest the colony.
Article 30. The Governor-General shall communicate to the home Government
before presenting to the insular parliament any bill originating in the executive
government of the island whenever, in his judgment, said bill may affect national
interests. Should any such bill originate in the Insular Parliament, the Government of
the island shall ask for a postponement of the debate until the home Government shall
have given its opinion.
In either case the correspondence passing between the two Governments shall be
laid before the chambers and published in the Official Gazette.
Article 31. All differences of jurisdiction between the several municipal,
provincial and insular assemblies, or between any of them and the executive, which by
their nature may not be referred to the home Government, shall be submitted to the
courts of justice in accordance with the rules herein prescribed.
TITLE VI.
Powers Vested in the Insular Parliament.
Article 32. The insular chambers shall have power to pass upon all matters not
specially and expressly reserved to the Cortes of the Kingdom or to the central
Government as herein provided, or as may be provide hereafter, in accordance with
the prescriptions set forth in additional Article 2.
In this manner, and without implying that the following enumeration presupposes any
limitation of their power to legislate on other subjects, they shall have power to
legislate on all matters and subjects concerning the Ministries of Justice, Interior,
Treasury, Public Works, Education and Agriculture.
They shall likewise have exclusive cognizance of all matters of a purely local nature
which may principally affect the colonial territory; and to this end they shall have power
to legislate on civil administration; on provincial, municipal, or judicial apportionment;
on public health, by land or sea, and on public credit, banks, and the monetary system.
This power, however, shall not impair the powers vested in the colonial executive
according to the laws in connection with the matters above mentioned.
Article 33. It shall be incumbent upon the colonial parliament to make
regulations under such national laws as may be passed by the Cortes and expressly
entrusted to it. Especially among such measures, parliament shall legislate, and may
do so at the first sitting, for the purpose of regulating the elections, the taking of the
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electoral census, qualifying electors, and exercising the right of suffrage; but in no
event shall these dispositions affect the rights of the citizens as established by the
electoral laws.
Article 34. Notwithsanding that the laws governing the judiciary and the
administration of the justice are of a national character, and therefore obligatory for the
colony, the Insular Parliament may, within the provisions of said laws, make rules or
propose to the home Government such measures as shall render easier the
admission, continuance, or promotion in the local courts of lawyers, natives of the
island, or practicing therein.
The Governor-General in Council shall have, as far as the island of Puerto Rico is
• concerned, the same power that has been vested heretofore in the Minister for
Overseas Territories for the appointment of the functionaries and subordinate and
auxiliary offices of the judicial order and as to the other matters connected with
administration of justice.
Article 35. The Insular Parliament shall have exclusive power to frame the local
budget of expenditures and revenues, including the revenue corresponding to the
island as her quota of the national budget.
To this end the Governor-General shall present to the chambers every year before
the month of January the budget for the next fiscal year, divided in two parts, as
follows: The first part shall state the revenues needed to defray the expenses of
sovereignty, and the second part shall state the revenues and expenditures estimated
for the maintenance of the colonial administration.
Article 36. The Cortes of the Kingdom shall determine what expenditures are to
be considered by reason of their nature as obligatory expenses inherent to
sovereignty, and shall fix the amount every three years and the revenue needed to
defray the same, the Cortes reserving the right to alter this rule.
Article 37. All treaties of commerce affecting the island of Puerto Rico, be they
suggested by the insular or by the home Government, shall be made by the latter with
co-operation of special delegates duly authorized by the colonial government, whose
concurrence shall be acknowledged upon submitting the treaties to the Cortes.
Said treaties, when approved by the Cortes, shall be proclaimed as laws of the
Kingdom and as such shall obtain in the colony.
Article 38. Notice shall be given to the Insular Government of any commercial
treaties made without its participation as soon as said treaties shall become laws, to
the end that, within a period of three months, it may declare its acceptance or
nonacceptance of their stipulations. In case of acceptance the Governor-General shall
cause the treaty to be published in the Gazette as a colonial statute.
Article 39. The Insular Parliament shall also have power to frame the tariff and
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fix the duties to be paid on merchandise as well tor its importation into the territory of
the island as tor the exportation thereof.
Article 40. As a transition fro the old regime to the one newly established, and
until the home and insular governments may otherwise conjointly determine hereafter,
the commercial relations between the island and the metropolis shall be governed by
the following rules:
1 . No differential duty, whether fiscal or otherwise, either on imports or exports, shall
be imposed to the detriment of either insular or peninsular production.
2. The two governments shall make a schedule of articles of direct national origin to
which shall be allowed by common consent preferential duty over similar foreign
products.
In another schedule made in like manner shall be determined such articles of direct
insular production as shall be entitled to privileged treatment on their importation into
the peninsula and the amount of preferential duties thereon.
In neither case shall the preferential duty exceed thirty-five percent.
Should both governments agree upon the schedules and the preferential duties,
they shall be considered final and shall be enforced at once. In case of disagreement
the point in dispute shall be submitted to a committee of representatives of the Cortes,
consisting of an equal number of Puerto Ricans and Peninsulars. The committee shall
appoint its chairman, and in case of disagreement the eldest member shall preside.
The chairman shall have the casting vote.
3. The valuation tables concerning the articles in the schedules above mentioned
shall be fixed by mutual agreement, and shall be revised after discussion every two
years. The modifications which may thereupon become necessary in the tariff duties
shall be carried out at once by the respective governments.
TITLE VII
The Governor-General.
Article 41. The supreme authority of the colony shall be vested in a GovernorGeneral, appointed by the king on the nomination of the Council of Ministers. In his
capacity he shall have as Viceroyal Patron the power inherent in the Patronate of the
Indies; he shall have command of all military and naval forces in the island; he shall
act as delegate of the Ministries of State, War, Navy and Overseas Territories; all other
authorities in the island shall be subordinate to his, and he shall be responsible for the
preservation of order and the safety of the colony.
The Governor-General shall, before taking possession of his office, take an oath in
the presence of the King to discharge his duties faithfully and loyally.
Article 42. The Governor-General, representing the nation, will discharge by
himself and with the aid of his secretaries all the functions indicated in the preceding
articles and such others as may devolve upon him as direct delegate of the King in
matters of a national character.
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It shall be incumbent upon the Governor-General as representing the home
Government:
1. To appoint without restriction the secretaries of his cabinet.
2. To proclaim, execute, and cause to be executed in the island all laws, decrees,
treaties, international covenants, and all other acts emanating from the legislative
branch of the Government, as well as all decrees, royal commands, and all other
measures emanating from the executive which shall be communicated to him by the
Ministries of of which he acts as delegate.
Whenever in his judgment and in that of his secretaries he considers the resolutions
of the home Government as liable to injure the general interests of the nation or the
special interests of the island, he shall have power to suspend the publication and
execution thereof, and shall so notify the respective Ministry, stating the reasons for his
actions.
3. To grant pardons in the name of the King, within the limitations specially
prescribed to him in his instructions from the Government, and to stay the execution of
a death sentence whenever the gravity of circumstances shall so demand or the
urgency of the case shall allow of no time to solicit and obtain His Majesty's pardon;
but in either case he shall hear the counsel of his secretaries.
4. To suspend the guarantees set forth in articles 3, 5, 6, and 9, and in the first,
second, and third paragraphs of article 13 of the Constitution: to enforce legislation in
regard to public order, and to take all measures which he may deem necessary to
preserve the peace within and the safety without the territory entrusted to him after
hearing the counsel of his cabinet.
5. To take care that in the colony justice be promptly and fully administered, and that
it shall always be administered in the name of the King.
6. To hold direct communication on foreign affairs with the Ministers, diplomatic
agents, and consuls of Spain throughout America.
A full copy of such correspondence shall be simultaneously forwarded to the home
Ministry of State.
Article 43. It behooves the Governor-General, as the superior authority in the
colony and head of its administration:
1. To take care that the rights, powers, and privileges now vested or that may
henceforth be vested in the colonial administration be respected and protected.
2. To sanction and proclaim the acts of the Insular Parliament, which shall be
submitted to him by the president and secretaries of the respective chambers.
Whenever, in the judgment of the Governor-General, an act of the Insular Parliament
goes beyond its powers or impairs the rights of the citizens set forth in Article 1 of the
Constitution, or curtails the guarantees prescribed by law for the exercise of said
rights, or jeopardize the interest of the colony or of the nation, he shall forward the act
to the Council of Ministers of the Kingdom, which, within a period that shall not exceed
two months, shall either assent to it or return it to the governor-General with the
objections to its sanction and proclamation. The Insular Parliament may, in view of the
objections, reconsider or modify the act, if it deems fit, without a special proposition.
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If two months shall elapse without the central government giving any opinion as to a
measure agreed upon by the chambers which has been transmitted to it by the
Governor-General, the latter shall sanction and proclaim the same.
3. To appoint, suspend, and discharge the employees of the colonial administration,
upon the suggestion of the secretaries of the departments and in accordance with the
laws.
4. To appoint and remove, without restriction, the secretaries of his cabinet.
Article 44. No executive order of the Governor-General, acting as representative
and chief of the colony, shall take effect unless countersigned by a secretary of the
cabinet, who by this act alone shall make himself responsible for the same.
Article 45. There shall be five secretaries of department, to-wit: Grace and
Justice and Interior; Finance; Public Education; Public Works and Communications;
Agriculture, Industry and Commerce.
The Governor-General shall appoint the president of the cabinet from among the
secretaries, and shall also have the power to appoint a president without a
secretaryship.
The power to increase or diminish the number of secretaries comprising the colonial
cabinet, and to determine the scope of each department, is vested in the Insular
Parliament.
Article 46. The secretaries of the cabinet may be members of either the
Chamber of Representatives or the Council of Administration and take part in the
debates of either chamber, but a secretary shall only vote in the chamber of which he
is a member.
Article 47. The secretaries of the cabinet shall be responsible to the Insular
Parliament.
Article 48. The Governor-General shall not modify or abrogate his own orders
after they are assented to by the home Government, or when they shall declare some
rights, or when a sentence by a judicial court or administrative tribunal shall have been
based upon said orders, or when they shall deal with his own competency.
Article 49. The Governor-General shall not turn over his office when leaving the
island except by special command from the home Government. In case of absence
from the seat of government which prevents his discharging the duties of his office or
of disability to perform such duties, he can appoint one or more persons to take his
place, provided the home Government has not previously done so or the method of
substitution shall not be stated in his instructions.
Article 50. The Supreme Court shall have the sole power to try the GovernorGeneral when impeachment for his responsibilities as defined by the Penal Code.
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The Council of Ministers shall take cognizance of his other responsibilities.
Article 51. The Governor-General shall have the power, in spite of the provisions
of the different articles of this decree, to act upon his own responsibility, without
consulting his secretaries, in the following cases:
1. When forwarding to the home Government a bill passed by the Insular Parliament,
especially when, in his opinion, it shall abridge the rights set forth in Article 1 of the
ConstiMion of the Monarchy or the guarantees for the exercise thereof vouchsafed by
the laws.
2. When it shall be necessary to enforce the law or public order, especially if there be
no time or possibility to consult the home Government.
3. When enforcing national laws that shall have been approved by the Crown and
made applicable to all the Spanish territory or to the colony under his government.
The proceedings and means of action which the governor-General shall employ in
the above cases shall be determined by a special law.
TITLE VIII

Municipal and Provincial Government.
Article 52. Municipal organization shall be compulsory for every group of
population of more than one thousand inhabitants.
Groups of less number of inhabitants may organize the service of their community by
special covenants.
Every legally constituted municipality shall have power to frame its own laws
regarding public education; highways by land, river and the sea, public health;
municipal finances, as well as to freely appoint and remove its own employees.
Article 53. At the head of the province there shall be an assembly, which shall
be elected in the manner provided for by the colonial statutes, and shall be composed
of a number of members in proportion to the population.
Article 54. The provincial assembly shall be autonomous as regards the
creation and maintenance of public schools and colleges, charitable institutions and
provincial roads and ways by land, river, or sea; also as regards their own budgets and
the appointment and removal of their respective employees.
Article 55. The municipalities, as well as the provincial assembly, shall have
power to freely raise the necessary revenue to cover their expenditures, which no
other limitation than to make the means adopted compatible with the general system of
taxation of the island.
The resources for provincial appropriations shall be independent of municipal
resources.
Article 56. The mayors (alcaldes) and presidents of boards of aldermen
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(tenientes de alcalde} shall be chosen by their respective boards from among their
members.
Article 57. The mayors shall discharge without limitation the active duties of the
municipal administration, as executors of the resolutions of the board of aldermen or
their representatives.
Article 58. The aldermen (consejales} and the provincial assemblymen shall be
civilly responsible for the damages caused by their acts.
Article 59. The provincial assemblies shall freely choose their respective
presidents.
Article 60. The elections of aldermen and assemblymen shall be conducted in
such a manner as to allow for a legitimate representation of the minorities.
Article 61. The provincial and municipal laws now in effect in the island shall
continue in vogue, wherever not in conflict with the provisions of this decree, until the
Insular Parliament shall legislate in this matter.
Article 62. No colonial statute shall abridge the powers vested by the preceding
articles in the municipalities and the provincial assemblies.
TITLE IX

As to the Guarantees for the Fulfillment of this Colonial Constitution.

Article 63. Whenever a citizen shall consider that his rights have been violated
or his interests injured by the action of a municipality or the provincial assembly he
shall have the right to apply to the courts of justice for redress.
The ministry of justice shall, if so required by the agents of the executive government
of the colony, prosecute before the courts the boards of aldermen or the provincial
assembly charged with breaking the law or abusing their power.
Article 64. In cases referred to in the preceding article, the following courts shall
have jurisdiction: The Civil Court of the Territorial Audiencia shall try all claims against
municipalities; and the full bench of the Territorial Audiencia of Puerto Rico shall try all
claims against the provincial assembly.
Said courts, when the charges against any of the above-mentioned corporations
shall be for abuse of power, shall render their decisions by a full bench. From the
decision of the Territorial Audiencia an appeal shall be allowed to the Supreme Court
of the Kingdom.
Article 65. The redress of grievances which Article 62 grants to any citizen can
also be had collectively by means of public action, by appointing an attorney or
representative claimant.
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Article 66. Without in any way impairing the powers vested in the GovernorGeneral by Title V of the present decree, he may, whenever he deems fit, appear
before the Territorial Audiencia of Puerto Rico in his capacity of chief of the executive
government of the colony, to the end that said court finally decide any conflict of
jurisdiction between the executive power and the legislative chambers of the colony.
Article 67. Should any question of jurisdiction be raised between the Insular
Parliament and the Governor-General in his capacity as representative of the home
Government, which shall not have been submitted to the Council of Ministers of the
Kingdom by petition of the Insular Parliament, either party shall have the power to
bring the matter before the Supreme Court of the Kingdom, which shall render its
decision by full bench And in the first instance.
Article 68. The decisions rendered in all cases provided for in the preceding
articles shall be published in the collection of colonial statutes and shall form part of
the insular legislation.
Article 69. Every municipal measure for the purpose of contracting a loan or a
municipal debt shall be without effect, unless it be assented to by a majority of the
townspeople whenever one-third of the number of aldermen shall so demand.
The amount of the loan or debt which, according to the number of inhabitants of a
township, shall make the referendum proceeding necessary, shall be determined by
special statute.
Article 70. All legislative acts originating in the Insular Parliament or the Cortes
shall be compiled under the title of colonial statutes in a legislative collection, the
formation and publication of which shall be entrusted to the Governor-General as chief
of the colonial executive.
ADDITIONAL ARTICLES.
Article 1. Until the colonial statutes shall be published in due form, the laws of
the Kingdom shall be deemed applicable to all matters reserved to the jurisdiction of
the insular Government.
Article 2. When the present constitution shall be once approved by the Cortes of
the Kingdom for the islands of Cuba and Puerto Rico, it shall not be amended except
by virtue of a special law and upon the petition of the Insular Parliament.
Article 3. The provisions of the present decree shall obtain in their entirety in the
island of Puerto Rico; they shall, however, be ordained by special decree in order to
conform them to the population and nomenclature of said island.
Article 4. Pending contracts for public services affecting in common the Antilles
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and the Peninsula shall continue in their present shape until termination, and shall be
entirely governed by the conditions and stipulations therein made.
As regards other contracts already entered into, but not yet in operation, the
Governor-General shall consult the home Government, or the colonial chambers, as
the case may be, and the two governments shall by mutual accord decide as between
themselves the final form of such contract.
THE AUTONOMICAL CONSTITUTION.
TRANSITORY PROVISIONS.
Article 1. With a view to carry out the transition from the present regime to the
system hereby established with the greatest possible dispatch and the least
interruption of the public business, the Governor-General shall, whenever he deems it
timely and after consulting the home Government, appoint the secretaries of the
executive office as per Article 45 of this decree, and with their aid he shall conduct the
local government of the island until the insular chambers shall have been constituted.
The secretaries thus appointed shall vacate their offices as soon as the GovernorGeneral shall take his oath of office before the insular chambers, and the GovernorGeneral shall immediately appoint as their successors the members of parliament
who, in his judgment, most fully represent the majorities in the Chamber of
Representatives and the Council of Administration.
Article 2. In case that the insular Government may wish to use for other types of
public works the 250,000 pesos allocated under the law of August 24, 1896 to
subsidize the narrow-track railroad, it will inform the home Government of what will be
done.
Given at the Palace, this 25th day of November, 1897.
Marfa Cristina.
Praxedes Mateo Sagasta,
President of the Council of Ministers
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APPENDIX 2

CONSTITUTION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO 1
We, the people of Puerto Rico, in order to organize ourselves politically on a
fully democratic basis, to promote the general welfare, and to secure for ourselves and
our posterity the complete enjoyment of human rights, placing our trust in Almighty
God, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the commonwealth which, in the
exercise of our natural rights, we now create within our union with the United States of
America.
In so doing, we declare:
The democratic system is fundamental to the life of the Puerto Rican community;
We understand that the democratic system of government is one in which the
will of the people is the source of public power, the political order is subordinate to the
rights of man, and the free participation of the citizen in collective decisions is assured;
We consider as determining factors in our life our citizenship of the United
States of America and our aspiration continually to enrich our democratic heritage in
the individual and collective enjoyment of its rights and privileges; our loyalty to the
principles of the Federal Constitution; the existence in Puerto Rico of the two great
cultures of the American Hemisphere; our fervor for education; our faith in justice; our
devotion to the courageous, industrious, and peaceful way of life; our fidelity to
individual human values above and beyond social position, racial differences, and
economic interests; and our hope for a better world based on these principles.
ARTICLE 1
THE COMMONWEALTH
Section 1. The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is hereby constituted. Its political
power emanates from the people and shall be exercised in accordance with their will,
within the terms of the compact agreed upon between the people of Puerto Rico and
the United States of America.
Section 2. The government of the commonwealth of Puerto Rico shall be
republican in form and its legislative, judicial and executive branches as established
by this Constitution shall be equally subordinate to the sovereignty of the people of
1

The text for the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico can be found in Albert P.
Blauestein and Eric B. Blauestein, eds., Constitutions of Dependencies and Special Sovereignties.
(Dobbs Ferry, New York, Oceana Publications Inc., 1977.
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Puerto Rico.
Section 3. The political authority of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico shall
extend to the Island of Puerto Rico and to the adjacent islands within its jurisdiction.
Section 4. The seat of the government shall be the city of San Juan.
ARTICLE II
BILL OF RIGHTS
Section 1. The dignity of the human being is inviolable. All men are equal
before the law. No discrimination shall be made on account of race, color, sex, birth,
social origin or condition, or political or religious ideas. Both the laws and the system
of public education shall embody these principles of essential human equality.
Section 2. The laws shall guarantee the expression of the will of the people by
means of equal, direct and secret universal suffrage and shall protect the citizen
against any coercion in the exercise of the electoral franchise.
Section 3. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof. There shall be complete separation of church
and state.
Section 4. No law shall be made abridging the freedom of speech or of the
press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the government
for a redress of grievances.
Section 5. Every person has the right to an education which shall be directed to
the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms. There shall be a system of free and wholly
non-sectarian public education. Instruction in the elementary and secondary schools
shall be free and shall be compulsory in the elementary schools to the extent permitted
by the facilities of the state. No public property or public funds shall be used for the
support of schools or educational institutions other than those of the state. Nothing
contained in this provision shall prevent the state from furnishing to any child noneducational services established by law for the protection or welfare of children.
Section 6. Persons may join with each other and organize freely for any lawful
purpose, except in military or quasi-military organizations.
Section 7. The right to life, liberty and the enjoyment of property is recognized
as a fundamental right of man. The death penalty shall not exist. No person shall be
deprived of his liberty or property without due process of law. No person in Puerto
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Rico shall be denied the equal protection of the laws. No laws impairing the obligation
of contracts shall be enacted. A minimum amount of property and possessions shall
be exempt from attachment as provided by law.
Section 8. Every person has the right to the protection of law against abusive
attacks on his honor, reputation and private or family life.
Section 9. Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use except
upon payment of just compensation and in the manner provided by law. No law shall
be enacted authorizing condemnation of printing presses, machinery or material
devoted to publications of any kind. The buildings in which these objects are located
may be condemned only after a judicial finding of public convenience and necessity
pursuant to procedure that shall be provided by law, and may be taken before such a
judicial finding only when there is placed at the disposition of the publication an
adequate site in which it can be installed and continue to operate for a reasonable
time.
Section 10. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall no be violated.
Wire-tapping is prohibited.
No warrant for arrest or search and seizure shall issue except by judicial
authority and only upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons to be arrested or the
things to be seized.
Evidence obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in the courts.
Section 11 . In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to
have a speedy and public trial, to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation and to have a copy thereof, to be confronted with the witnesses against
him, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, to have
assistance of counsel, and to be presumed innocent.
In all prosecutions for a felony the accused shall have the right of trial by an
impartial jury composed of twelve residents of the district, who may render their verdict
by a majority vote which in no case may be less than nine.
No person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself and the failure of the accused to testify may be neither taken into consideration
nor commented upon against him.
No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.
Before conviction every accused shall be entitled to be admitted to bail.
Incarceration prior to trial shall not exceed six months nor shall bail or fines be
excessive. No person shall be imprisoned for debt.
Section 12. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude shall exist except in the
latter case as a punishment for crime after the accused has been duly convicted.
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Cruel and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted. Suspension of civil rights
including the right to vote shall cease upon service of the term of imprisonment
imposed.
No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be passed.
Section 13. The writ of habeas corpus shall be granted without delay and free
of costs. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless the
public safety requires it in case of rebellion, insurrection or invasion. Only the
Legislative Assembly shall have the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus and the laws regulating its issuance.
The military authority shall always be subordinate to civil authority.
Section 14. No titles of nobility or other hereditary honors shall be granted. No
officer or employee of the Commonwealth shall accept gifts, donation, decorations or
offices from any foreign country or officer without prior authorization by the Legislative
Assembly.
Section 15. The employment of children less than fourteen years of age in any
occupation which is prejudicial to their health or morals or which places them in
jeopardy of life or limb is prohibited.
No child less than sixteen years of age shall be kept in custody in a jail or
penitentiary.
Section 16. The right of every employee to choose his occupation freely and to
resign therefrom is recognized, as is his right to equal pay for equal work, to a
reasonable minimum salary, to protection against risks to his health or person in his
work or employment, and to an ordinary workday which shall not exceed eight hours.
An employee may work in excess of this daily limit only if he is paid extra
compensation as provided by law, at a rate never less than one and one-half times the
regular rate at which he is employed.
Section 17. Persons employed by private businesses, enterprises and
individual employers and by agencies or instrumentalities of the government operating
as private businesses or enterprises, shall have the right to organize and to bargain
collectively with their employers through representatives of their own free choosing in
order to promote their welfare.
Section 18. In order to assure their right to organize and to bargain collectively,
persons employed by private businesses, enterprises and individual employers and
by agencies, enterprises and individual employers and by agencies or
instrumentalities of the government operating as private businesses or enterprises, in
their direct relation with their own employers shall have the right to strike, to picket and
to engage in other legal concerted activities.
Nothing herein contained shall impair the authority of the Legislative Assembly
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to enact laws to deal with grave emergencies that clearly imperil the public health or
safety or essential public services.
Section 19. The foregoing enumeration of rights shall not be construed
restrictively nor does it contemplate the exclusion of other rights not specifically
mentioned which belong to the people in a democracy. The power of the Legislative
Assembly to enact laws for the protection of the life, health and general welfare of the
people shall likewise no be construed restrictively.
ARTICLE Ill
THE LEGISLATURE
Section 1. The legislative power shall be vested in a Legislative Assembly,
which shall consist of two houses, the Senate and the House of Representatives,
whose members shall be elected by direct vote at each general election.
Section 2. The Senate shall be composed of twenty-seven Senators and the
House of Representatives of fifty-one Representatives, except as these numbers may
be increases in accordance with the provisions of Section 7 of this Article.
Section 3. for the purpose of election of members of the Legislative Assembly,
Puerto Rico shall be divided into eight senatorial districts and forty representative
districts. Each senatorial district shall elect two Senators and each representative
district one Representative.
There shall also be eleven Senators and eleven Representatives elected at
large. No elector may vote for more that one candidate for Senator at Large or for
more than one candidate for Representative at Large.
Section 4. In the first and subsequent elections under this Constitution the
division of senatorial and representative districts as provided in Article VI 11 shall be in
effect. After each decennial census beginning with the year 1960, said division shall
be revised by a Board composed of the Chef Justice of the Supreme Court as
Chairman and of two additional members appointed by the Governor with the advice
and consent of the Senate. The two additional members shall not belong to the same
political party. Any revision shall maintain the number of senatorial and representative
districts here created, which shall be composed of contiguous and compact territory
and shall be organized, insofar as practicable, upon the basis of population and
means of communication. Each senatorial district shall always include five
representative districts.
The decisions of the Board shall be made by majority vote and shall take effect
in the general elections next following each revision. The Board shall cease to exist
after the completion of each revision.
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Section 5. No person shall be a member of the Legislative Assembly unless he
is able to read and write the Spanish or English language and unless he is a citizen of
the United States and of Puerto Rico and has resided in Puerto Rico at least two years
immediately prior to the date of his election or appointment. No person shall be a
member of the Senate who is not over thirty years of age, and no person shall be a
member of the House of Representatives who is not over twenty-five years of age.
Section 6. No person shall be eligible to election or appointment as Senator or
Representative for a district unless he has resided therein at least one year
immediately prior to his election or appointment. When there is more than one
representative district in a municipality, residence in the municipality shall satisfy this
requirement.
Section 7. If in a general election more than two-thirds of the members of either
house are elected from one political party or from a single ticket, as both are defined
by law, the number of members shall be increased in the following cases:
(a) If the party or ticket which elected more than two-thirds of the members of
either or both houses shall have obtained less than two-thirds of the total number of
votes cast for the office of Governor, the number of members of the Senate or of the
House of Representatives or of both bodies, whichever may be the case, shall be
increased by declaring elected a sufficient number of candidates of the minority party
or parties to bring the total number of members of the minority party or parties to nine
in the Senate and to seventeen in the House of Representatives. when there is more
than one minority party, said additional members shall be declared elected from
among the candidates of each minority party in the proportion that the number of votes
cast for the candidate of each of said parties for the office of governor bears to the total
number of votes cast for the candidates of all the minority parties for the office of
Governor.
When one or more minority parties shall have obtained representation in a
proportion equal to or greater than the proportion of votes received by their respective
candidates for Governor, such party or parties shall not be entitled to additional
members until the representation established for each of the other minority parties
under these provisions shall have been completed.
(b) If the party or ticket which elected more than two-thirds of the members of
either or both houses shall have obtained more than two-thirds of the total number of
votes cast for the office of Governor, and one or more minority parties shall not have
elected the number of members in the Senate or in the House of Representatives or in
both houses, whichever may be the case, which corresponds to the proportion of votes
cast by each of them for the office of Governor, such additional number of their
candidates shall be declared elected as is necessary in order to complete said
proportion as nearly as possible, but the number of Senators of all the minority parties
shall never, under this provision, be more than nine or that of Representatives more
than seventeen.
In order to select additional members of the Legislative Assembly from a
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minority party in accordance with these provisions, its candidates at large who have
not been elected shall be the first to be declared elected in the order of the votes that
they have obtained, and thereafter its district candidates who, not having been elected,
have obtained in their respective districts the highest proportion of the total number of
votes cast as compared to the proportion of votes cast in favor of other candidates of
the same party not elected to an equal office in the other districts.
The additional Senators and Representatives whose election is declared under
this section shall be considered for all purposes as Senators at Large or
Representatives at Large.
The measures necessary to implement these guarantees, the method of
adjudicating fractions that may result from the application of the rules contained in this
section, and the minimum number of votes that a minority party must cast in favor of its
candidate for Governor in order to have the right to the representation provided herein
shall be determined by the Legislative Assembly.
Section 8. The term of office of Senators and Representatives shall begin on
the second day of January immediately following the date of the general election in
which they shall have been elected. If, prior to the fifteen months immediately
preceding the date of the next general election, a vacancy occurs in the office of
Senator Or Representative for a district, the Governor shall call a special election in
said district within thirty days following the date on which the vacancy occurs. This
election shall be held not later than ninety days after the call, and the person elected
shall hold office for the rest of the unexpired term of his predecessor. When said
vacancy occurs during a legislative session, or when the Legislative Assembly or the
Senate has been called for a date prior to the certification of the results of the special
election, the presiding officer of the appropriate house shall fill said vacancy by
appointing the person recommended by the central committee of the political party of
which his predecessor in office was a member. Such person shall hold the office until
certification of the election of the candidate who was elected. When the vacancy
occurs within fifteen months prior to a general election, or when it occurs in the office of
a Senator at Large or a Representative at Large, the presiding officer of the
appropriate house shall fill it, upon the recommendation of the political party of which
the previous holder of the office was member, by appointing a person selected in the
same manner as that in which his predecessor was selected. A vacancy in the office
of a Senator at Large or a Representative at Large elected as an independent
candidate shall be filled by an election in all districts.
Section 9. Each house shall be the judge of the election, returns and
qualifications of its members; shall choose its own officers; shall adopt rules for its own
proceedings appropriate to legislative bodies; and, with the concurrence of threefourths of the total number of members of which it is composed, may expel any
member for the causes established in Section 21 of this Article, authorizing
impeachments. The Senate shall elect a President and the House of Representatives
a Speaker from among their respective members.
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Section 10. The Legislative Assembly shall be deemed a continuous body
during the term for which its members are elected and shall meet in regular session
each year commencing on the second Monday in January. The duration of regular
sessions and the periods of time for introduction and consideration of bills shall be
prescribed by law. When the Governor calls the Legislative Assembly into special
session it may consider only those matters specified in the call or in any special
message sent to it by him during the session. No special session shall continue
longer than twenty calendar days.
Section 11. The sessions of each house shall be open.
Section 12. A majority of the total number of members of which each house is
composed shall constitute a quorum, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to
day and shall have authority to compel the attendance of absent members.
Section 13. The two houses shall meet in the capitol of Puerto Rico and neither
of them may adjourn for more than three consecutive days without the consent of the
other.
Section 14. No member of the Legislative Assembly shall be arrested while the
house of which he is a member is in session, or during the fifteen days before or after
such session, except for treason, felony or breach of the peace. The members of the
Legislative Assembly shall not be questioned in any other place for any speech,
debate or vote in either house or in any committee.
Section 15. No Senator or Representative may, during the term for which he

was elected or chosen, be appointed to any civil office in the Government of Puerto
Rico, its municipalities or instrumentalities, which shall have been created or the salary
of which shall have been increased during said term. No person may hold office in the
Government of Puerto Rico, its municipalities or instrumentalities and be a Senator or
Representative at the same time. These provisions shall not prevent a member of the
Legislative Assembly from being designated to perform functions ad honorem.
Section 16. The Legislative Assembly shall have the power to create,
consolidate or reorganize executive departments and to define their functions.
Section 17. No bill shall become a law unless it has been printed, read,
referred to a committee and returned therefrom with a written report, but either house
may discharge a committee from the study and report of any bill and proceed to the
consideration thereof. Each house shall keep a journal of its proceedings and of the
votes cast for and against bills. The legislative proceedings shall be publishes in a
daily record in the form determined by law. Every bill, except general appropriation
bills, shall be confined to one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title, and
any part of an act whose subject has not been expressed in the title shall be void. The
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general appropriation act shall contain only appropriations and rules for their
disbursement. No bill shall be amended in a manner that changes its original purpose
or incorporates matters extraneous to it. In amending any article or section of a law,
said article or section shall be promulgated in its entirety as amended. All bills for
raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may
propose or concur with amendments as on other bills.
Section 18. The subjects which may be dealt with by means of joint resolution
shall be determined by law, but every joint resolution shall follow the same legislative
process as that of a bill.
Section 19. Every bill which is approved by a majority of the total number of
members of which each house is composed shall be submitted to the Governor and
shall become law if he signs it or if he does not return it, with his objections, to the
house in which it originated within ten days. (Sundays excepted) counted from the
date on which he shall have received it.
When the Governor returns a bill the house that receives it shall enter his
objections on its journal and both houses may reconsider it. If approved by two-thirds
of the total number of members of which each house is composed, said bill shall
become law.
If the Legislative Assembly adjourns sine die before the Governor has acted on
a bill that has been presented to him less than ten days before, he is relieved of the
obligation of returning it with his objections and the bill shall become law only if the
Governor signs it within thirty days after receiving it.
Every final passage or reconsideration of a bill shall be by a roll-call vote.
Section 20. In approving any appropriation bill that contains more than one
item, the Governor may eliminate one or more of such items or reduce their amounts,
at the same time reducing the total amounts involved.
Section 21 . The House of Representatives shall have exclusive power to
initiate impeachment proceedings and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of the total
number of members of which it is composed, to bring and indictment. The Senate
shall have exclusive power to try and to decide impeachment cases, and in meeting
for such purposes the Senators shall act in the name of the people and under oath or
affirmation. No judgment of conviction in an impeachment trial shall be pronounced
without the concurrence of three-fourths of the total number of members of which the
Senate is composed, and the judgment shall be limited to removal from office. The
person impeached, however, may be liable and subject to indictment, trial, judgment
and punishment according to law. The causes of impeachment shall be treason,
bribery, other felonies, and misdemeanors involving moral turpitude. The Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court shall preside at the impeachment trial of the Governor.
The two houses may conduct impeachment proceedings in their regular or
special sessions. The presiding officers of the two houses, upon written request of
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two-thirds of the total number of members of which the House of Representatives is
composed, must convene them to deal with such proceedings.
Section 22. The Governor shall appoint a Controller with the advice and
consent of a majority of the total number of members of which each house is
composed. The Controller shall meet the requirements prescribed by law and shall
hold office for a term of ten yeas and until his successor has been appointed and
qualifies. The Controller shall audit all the revenues, accounts and expenditures of the
Commonwealth, of its agencies and instrumentalities and of its municipalities, in order
to determine whether they have been made in accordance with law. He shall render
annual reports and any special reports that may be required of him by the Legislative
Assembly or by the Governor.
In the performance of his duties the Controller shall be authorized to administer
oaths, take evidence and compel under pain of contempt, the attendance of witnesses
and the production of books, letters, documents, papers, records and all other articles
deemed essential to a full understanding of the matter under investigation.
The Controller may be removed for the causes and pursuant to the procedure
established in the preceding section.
ARTICLE IV
THE EXECUTIVE
Section 1. The executive power shall be vested in a Governor, who shall be
elected by direct vote in each general election.
Section 2. The Governor shall hold office for the term of four years from the
second day of January of the year following his election and until his successor has
been elected and qualifies. He shall reside in Puerto Rico and maintain his office in its
capital city.
Section 3. No person shall be Governor unless, on the date of the election, he
is at least thirty-five years of age, and is and has been during the preceding five years
a citizen of the United States and a citizen and bona fide resident of Puerto Rico.
Section 4. The Governor shall execute the laws and cause them to be
executed.
He shall call the Legislative Assembly or the Senate into special session when
in his judgment the public interest so requires.
He shall appoint, in the manner prescribed by this Constitution or by law, all
officers whose appointment he is authorized to make. He shall have the power to
make appointments while the Legislative Assembly is not in session. Any such
appointments that require the advice and consent of the Senate or of both houses
shall expire at the end of the next regular session.
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He shall be the commander-in-chief of the militia.
He shall have the power to call out the militia and summon the posse comitatus
in order to prevent or suppress rebellion, invasion or any serious disturbance of the
public peace.
He shall have the power to proclaim martial law when the public safety requires
it in case of rebellion or invasion or imminent danger thereof. The Legislative
Assembly shall meet forthwith on their own initiative to ratify or revoke the
proclamation.
He shall have the power to suspend the execution of sentences in criminal
cases and to grant pardons, commutations of punishment, and total or partial
remissions of fines and forfeitures for crimes committed in violation of the laws of
Puerto Rico. This power shall not extend to cases of impeachment.
He shall approve or disapprove in accordance with this Constitution the joint
resolutions and bills passed by the Legislative Assembly.
He shall present to the Legislative Assembly, at the beginning of each regular
session, a message concerning the affairs of the Commonwealth and a report
concerning the state of the Treasury of Puerto Rico and the proposed expenditures for
the ensuing fiscal year. Said report shall contain the information necessary for the
formulation of a program of legislation.
He shall exercise the other powers and functions and discharge the other duties
assigned to him by this Constitution or by law.
Section 5. For the purpose of exercising executive power, the Governor shall
be assisted by Secretaries whom he shall appoint with the advice and consent of the
Senate. the appointment of the Secretary of State shall in addition require the advice
and consent of the House of Representatives, and the person appointed shall fulfill the
requirements established in Section 3 of this article. The Secretaries shall collectively
constitute the Governor's advisory council, which shall be designated as the Council of
Secretaries.
Section 6. Without prejudice to the power of the Legislative Assembly to create,
reorganize and consolidate executive departments and to define their function, the
following departments are hereby established: State, Justice, Education, Health,
Treasury, Labor, Agriculture and Commerce, and Public Works. Each of these
executive departments shall be headed by a Secretary.
Section 7. When a vacancy occurs in the office of Governor, caused by death,
resignation, removal, total and permanent incapacity, or any other absolute disability,
said office shall devolve upon the Secretary of State, who shall hold it for the rest of
the term and until a new Governor has been elected and qualifies. In the event that
vacancies exist at the same time in both the office of Governor and that of Secretary of
State, the law shall provide which of the secretaries shall serve as Governor.
Section 8. When for any reason the Governor is temporarily unable to perform
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his functions, the Secretary of State shall substitute for him during the period he is
unable to serve. If for any reason the secretary of State is no available, the Secretary
determined by law shall temporarily hold the office of Governor.
Section 9. If the Governor-elect shall not have qualified or if he has qualified
and a permanent vacancy occurs in the off ice of Governor before he shall have
appointed a Secretary of State, or before said Secretary, having been appointed, shall
brave qualified, the Legislative Assembly just elected, upon convening for its first
regular session, shall elect, by a majority of the total number of members of which
each house is composed, a Governor who shall hold office until his successor is
elected in the next general election and qualifies.
Section 1O. The Governor may be removed for the causes and pursuant to the
procedure established in Section 21 of Article Ill of this Constitution.
ARTICLE V
THE JUDICIARY
Section 1. The judicial power of Puerto Rico shall be vested in a Supreme
Court, and in such other courts as may be established by law.
Section 2. The courts of Puerto Rico shall constitute a unified judicial system for
purposes of jurisdiction, operation and administration. The Legislative Assembly may
create and abolish courts, except for the Supreme Court, in a manner not consistent
with this Constitution, and shall determine the venue and organization of the courts.
Section 3. The Supreme Court shall be the court of last resort in Puerto Rico
and shall be composed of a Chief Justice and four Associate Justices. The number of
Justices may be changed only by law upon request of the Supreme Court.
Section 4. The Supreme Court shall sit, in accordance with rules adopted by it,
as a full court or in divisions composed of not less than three Justices. No law shall be
held unconstitutional except by a majority of the total number of Justices of which the
Court is composed in accordance with this Constitution or with law. [As amended in
General Election of Nov. 8, 1960.]
Section 5. The Supreme Court, any of its divisions, or any of its Justices may
hear in the first instance petitions for habeas corpus and any other courses and
proceedings as determined by law.
Section 6. The Supreme Court shall adopt for the courts rules of evidence and
of civil and criminal procedure which shall not abridge, enlarge or modify the
substantive rights of the parties. The rules thus adopted shall be submitted to the
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Legislative Assembly at the beginning of its next regular session and shall not go into
effect until sixty days after the close of said session, unless disapproved by the
Legislative Assembly, which shall have the power both at said session and
subsequently to amend, repeal or supplement any of said rules by a specific law to
that effect.
Section 7. The Supreme Court shall adopt rules for the administration of the
courts. These rules shall be subject to the laws concerning procurement, personnel,
audit and appropriation of funds, and other laws which apply generally to all branches
of the government. The Chief Justice shall direct the administration of the courts and
shall appoint an administrative director who shall hold office at the will of the Chief
Justice.
Section 8. Judges shall be appointed by the Governor with the advice and
consent of the Senate. Justices of the Supreme Court shall not assume office until
after confirmation by the Senate and shall hold their offices during good behavior. The
terms of office of the other judges shall be fixed by law and shall not be less than that
fixed for the terms of office of a judge of the same or equivalent category existing when
this Constitution takes effect. The other officials and employees of the courts shall be
appointed in the manner provided by law.
Section 9. No person shall be appointed a Justice of the Supreme Court unless
he is a citizen of the United States and of Puerto Rico, shall have been admitted to the
practice of law in Puerto Rico at least ten years prior to his appointment, and shall
have resided in Puerto Rico at least five years immediately prior thereto.
Section 10. The Legislative Assembly shall establish a retirement system for
judges. Retirement shall be compulsory at the age of seventy years.
Section 11 . Justices of the Supreme Court may be removed for the causes and
pursuant to the procedure established in Section 21 of Article 111 of this Constitution.
Judges of the other courts may be removed by the Supreme Court for the causes and
pursuant to the procedure provided by law.
Section 12. No judge shall make a direct or indirect financial contribution to any
political organization or party, or hold any executive office therein, or participate in a
political campaign of any kind, or be a candidate for an elective public office unless he
has resigned his judicial office at least six months prior to his nomination.
Section 13. In the event that a court or any of its divisions or sections is
changed or abolished by law, the person holding a post of judge therein shall continue
to hold it during the rest of the term for which he was appointed and shall perform the
judicial functions assigned to him by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.
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ARTICLE VI
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Section 1. The Legislative Assembly shall have the power to create, abolish
consolidate and reorganize municipalities; to change their territorial limits; to
determine their organization and functions; and to authorize them to develop programs
for the general welfare and to create any agencies necessary for that purpose.
No law abolishing or consolidating municipalities shall take effect until ratified in
a referendum by a majority of the qualified electors voting in said referendum in each
of the municipalities to be abolished or consolidated. The referendum shall be
conducted in the manner determined by law, which shall include the applicable
procedures of the election laws in effect when the referendum law is approved.
Section 2. The power of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico to impose and
collect taxes and to authorize their imposition and collection by municipalities shall be
exercised as determined by the Legislative Assembly and shall never be surrendered
or suspended. The power of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico to contract and to
authorize the contracting of debts shall be exercised as determined by the Legislative
Assembly, but no direct obligations of the Commonwealth for money borrowed directly
by the Commonwealth evidenced by bonds or notes for the payment of which the full
faith credit and taxing power of the Commonwealth shall be pledged shall be issued
by the Commonwealth if the total of (i) the amount of principal of and interest on such
bonds and notes, together with the amount of principal of and interest on all such
bonds and notes theretofore issued by the Commonwealth and then outstanding,
payable in any fiscal year and (ii) any amounts paid by the Commonwealth in the fiscal
year next preceding the then current fiscal year for principal or interest on account of
any outstanding obligations evidenced by bonds or notes guaranteed by the
commonwealth, shall exceed 15% of the average of the total amount of the annual
revenues raised under the provisions of commonwealth legislation and covered into
the Treasury of Puerto Rico in the two fiscal years next preceding the then current
fiscal year; and no such bonds or notes issued by the Commonwealth for any purpose
other than housing facilities shall mature later than 30 years from their date and no
bonds or notes issued for housing facilities shall mature later than 40 years from their
date; and the Commonwealth shall not guarantee any obligations evidenced by bonds
or notes if the total of the amount payable in any fiscal year on account of principal of
and interest on all the direct obligations referred to above theretofore issued by the
Commonwealth and then outstanding and the amounts referred to in item (ii) above
shall exceed 15 percent of the average of the total amount of such annual revenues.
The Legislative Assembly shall fix limitations for the issuance of direct
obligations by any of the municipalities of Puerto Rico for money borrowed directly by
such municipality evidenced by bonds or notes for the payment of which the full faith,
credit and taxing power of such municipality shall be pledged provided, however, that
no such bonds or notes shall be issued by any municipality in an amount which
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together with the amount of all such bonds and notes theretofore issued by such
municipality and then outstanding, shall exceed the percentage determined by the
Legislative Assembly, which shall be not less than five per centum (5%) nor more than
ten per centum (10%) of the aggregate tax valuation of the property within such
municipality.
The Secretary of the Treasury may be required to apply the available revenues
including surplus to the payment of interest on the public debt and the amortization
thereof in any case provided for by Section 8 of this Article VI at the suit of any holder
of bonds or notes issued in evidence thereof.
[As amended by the voters at a referendum held Dec. 10, 1961.]
Section 3. The rule of taxation in Puerto Rico shall be uniform.
Section 4. General elections shall be held every tour years on the day of
November determined by the Legislative Assembly. In said elections there shall be
elected a Governor, the members of the Legislative Assembly, and the other officials
whose election on that date is provided tor by law.
Every person over twenty-one years of age shall be entitled to vote it he fulfills
the other conditions determined by law. No person shall be deprived of the right to
vote because he does not know how to read or write or does not own property.
All matters concerning the electoral process, registration of voters, political
parties and candidates shall be determined by law.
Every popularly elected official shall be elected by direct vote and any
candidate who receives more votes than any other candidate for the same office shall
be declared elected.
Section 5. The laws shall be promulgated in accordance with the procedure
prescribed by law and shall specify the terms under which they shall take effect.
Section 6. If at the end of any fiscal year the appropriations necessary for the
ordinary operating expenses of the Government and tor the payment of interest on and
amortization of the public debt tor the ensuing fiscal year shall not have been made,
the several sums appropriated in the last appropriation acts tor the objects and
purposes therein specified, so tar as the same may be applicable, shall continue in
effect item by item, and the Governor shall authorize the payments necessary for such
purposes until corresponding appropriations are made.
Section 7. The appropriations made tor any fiscal year shall not exceed the
total revenues, including available surplus, estimated for said fiscal year unless the
imposition of taxes sufficient to cover said appropriations is provided by law.
Section 8. In case the valuable revenues including surplus tor any fiscal year
are insufficient to meet the appropriations made tor that year, interest on the public
debt and amortization thereof shall first be paid, and other disbursements shall
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thereafter be made in accordance with the order of priorities established by law.
Section 9. Public property and funds shall only be disposed of for public
purposes, for the support and operation of state institutions, and pursuant to law.
Section 10. No law shall give extra compensation to any public officer,
employee, agent or contractor after services shall have been rendered or contract
made. No law shall extend the term of any public officer or diminish his salary or
emoluments after his election or appointment. No person shall draw a salary for more
than one office or position in the government of Puerto Rico.
Section 11 . The salaries of the Governor, the Secretaries, the members of the
Legislative Assembly, the Controller and Judges shall be fixed by a special law and,
except for the salaries of the members of the Legislative Assembly, shall not be
decreased during the terms for which they are elected or appointed. The salaries of
the Governor and the controller shall not be increased during said terms. No increase
in the salaries of the members of the Legislative Assembly shall take effect until the
expiration of the term of the Legislative Assembly during which it is enacted. Any
reduction of the salaries of the members of the Legislative Assembly shall be effective
only during the term of the Legislative Assembly which approves it.
Section 12. The Governor shall occupy and use, free of rent, the buildings and
properties belonging to the Commonwealth which have been or shall hereafter be
used and occupied by him as chief executive.
Section 13. The procedure for granting franchises, rights, privileges and
concessions of a public or quasi-public nature shall be determined by law, but every
concession of this kind to a person or private entity must be approved by the Governor
or by the executive official whom he designates. Every franchise, right, privilege or
concession of a public or quasi-public nature shall be subject to amendment,
alteration or repeal as determined by law.
Section 14. No corporation shall be authorized to conduct the business of
buying and selling real estate or be permitted to hold or own real estate except such
as may be reasonably necessary to enable it to carry out the purposes for which it was
created, and every corporation authorized to engage in agriculture shall by its charter
be restricted to the ownership and control of not to exceed five hundred acres of land;
and this provision shall be held to prevent any member of a corporation engaged in
agriculture from being in any wise interested in any other corporation engaged in
agriculture.
Corporation, however, may loan funds upon real estate security, and purchase
real estate when necessary for the collection of loans, but they shall dispose of real
estate so obtained within five years after receiving the title.
Corporations not organized in Puerto Rico, but doing business in Puerto Rico,
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shall be bound by the provisions of this section so far as they are applicable.
These provisions shall not prevent the ownership, possession or management
of lands in excess of five hundred acres by the Commonwealth, its agencies or
instrumentalities.
Section 15. The Legislative Assembly shall determine all matters concerning
the flag, the seal and the anthem of the Commonwealth. Once determined, no law
changing them shall take effect until one year after the general election next following
the date of enactment of said law.
Section 16. All public officials and employees of the Commonwealth, its
agencies, instrumentalities and political subdivisions, before entering upon their
respective duties, shall take oath to support the Constitution of the United States and
the Constitution and laws of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
Section 17. In case of invasion, rebellion, epidemic or any other event giving
rise to a state of emergency, the Governor may call the Legislative Assembly to meet in
a place other than the Capitol of Puerto Rico, subject to the approval or disapproval of
the Legislative Assembly. Under the same conditions, the Governor may, during the
period of emergency, order the government, its agencies and instrumentalities to be
moved temporarily to a place other than the seat of the government.
Section 18. All criminal actions in the courts of the Commonwealth shall be
conducted in the name and by the authority of "The People of Puerto Rico" until
otherwise provided by law.
Section 19. It shall be the public policy of the Commonwealth to conserve,
develop and use its natural resources in the most effective manner possible for the
general welfare of the community; to conserve and maintain buildings and places
declared by the Legislative Assembly to be of historic or artistic value; to regulate its
penal institutions in a manner that effectively achieves their purposes and to provide,
within the limits of available resources, for adequate treatment of delinquents in order
to make possible their moral and social rehabilitation.
ARTICLE VII
AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION
Section 1. The Legislative Assembly may propose amendments to this
Constitution by a concurrent resolution approved by not less than two-thirds of the total
number of members of which each house is composed. All proposed amendments
shall be submitted to the qualified electors in a special referendum, but if the
concurrent resolution is approved by not less than three-fourths of the total number of
members of which each house is composed, the Legislative Assembly may provide
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that the referendum shall be held at the same time as the next general election. Each
proposed amendment shall be voted on separately and not more than three proposed
amendments may be submitted at the same referendum. Every proposed amendment
shall specify the terms under which it shall take effect, and it shall become a part of this
Constitution if it is ratified by a majority of the electors voting thereon. Once approved
a proposed amendment must be published at least three months prior to the date of
the referendum.
Section 2. The Legislative Assembly, by a concurrent resolution approved twothirds of the total number of members of which each house is compose, may submit to
the qualified electors at a referendum, held at the same time as a general election, the
question of whether a constitutional convention shall be called to revise this
Constitution. If a majority of the electors voting on this question vote in favor of the
revision, it shall be made by a Constitutional Convention elected in the manner
provided by law. Every revision of this Constitution shall be submitted to the qualified
electors at a special referendum for ratification or rejection by a majority of the votes
cast at the referendum.
Section 3. No amendment to this Constitution shall alter the republican form of
government established by it or abolish its bill of rights. Any amendment or revision of
this constitution shall be consistent with the resolution enacted by the Congress of the
United States approving this constitution, with the applicable provisions of the
Constitution of the United States, with the Puerto Rican Federai Relations Act and with
Pubiic Law 600, Eighty-first Congress, adopted in the nature of a compact.
ARTiCLE VIII
SENATORIAL AND REPRESENTATIVE DISTRICTS
Section 1. The senatorial and representative districts shall be the following:
I. SENATORIAL DISTRICT OF SAN JUAN, which shall be composed of the
following Representative Districts: 1. - The Capital of Puerto Rico, excluding the
present electoral precincts of Santurce and Rio Piedras; 2. - Electoral zones numbers
1 and 2 of the present precinct of Santurce; 3. - Electoral zone number 3 of the present
precinct of Santurce; 4. - Electoral zone number 4 of the present precinct of Santurce;
and 5. - Wards Hato Rey, Puerto Nuevo and Caparra Heights of the Capital of Puerto
Rico.
II. SENATORIAL DISTRICT OF BAYAMON, which shall be composed of the
following Representative Districts: 6. - The municipality of Bayamon; 7. - The
municipalities of Carolina and Trujillo Alto; 8. - The present electoral precinct of Rfo
Piedras, excluding wards Hato Rey, Puerto Nuevo and Caparra Heights of the Capital
of Puerto Rico; 9. - The municipalities of Catano, Guaynabo and Toa Baja; and 10. The municipalities of Toa Alta, Corozal and Naranjito.
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111. SENATORIAL DISTRICT OF ARECIBO, which shall be composed of the
following Representative Districts: 11. - The municipalities of Vega Baja, Vega Alta and
Dorado; 12. - The municipalities of Manatf and Barceloneta; 13. - The municipalities of
Ciales and Morovis; 14. - The municipality of Arecibo; and 15. - The municipality of
Utuado.
IV. SENATORIAL DISTRICT OF AGUADILLA, which shall be composed of the
following Representative Districts: 16. - The municipalities of Camuy, Hatillo and
Quebradillas; 17. - The municipalities of Aguadilla and lsabela; 18. - The
municipalities of San Sebastian and Moca; 19. - The municipalities of Lares, Las
Marfas and Maricao; and 20. - The municipalities of Aiiasco, Aguada and Rinc6n.
V. SENATORIAL DISTRICT OF MAYAGOEZ, which shall be composed of the
following Representative Districts: 21. - The municipality of Mayag0ez; 22. - The
municipalities of Cabo Rojo, Hormigueros and Lajas; 23. - The municipalities of San
German and Sabana Grande; 24. - The municipalities of Yauco and Guanica; and 25.
- The municipalities of Guayanilla and Penuelas.
VI. SENATORIAL DISTRICT OF PONCE, which shall be composed of the
following Representative Districts: 26. - The first, second, third, fourth, fifth and sixth
wards and the City Beach of the municipality of Ponce; 27. - The municipality of Ponce,
except for the first, second, third, fourth, fifth and sixth wards and the City Beach; 28. The municipalities of Adjuntas and Jayuya; 29. - The municipalities Juana Diaz, Santa
Isabel and Villalba; and 30. - The municipalities of Coamo and Orocovis.
VII. SENATORIAL DISTRICT OF GUAYAMA, which shall be composed of the
following Representative Districts: 31. - The municipalities of Aibonito, Barranquitas
and Comerfo; 32. - The municipalities of Cayey and Cidra; 33. - The municipalities of
Caguas and Aguas Buenas; 34. - The municipalities of Guayama and Salinas; and 35.
- The municipalities of Patillas, Maunabo and Arroyo.
VIII. SENATORIAL DISTRICT OF HUMACAO, which shall be composed of the
following Representative Districts: 36. - The municipalities of Humacao and Yabucoa;
37. - The municipalities of Juncos, Gurabo and San Lorenzo; 38. - The municipalities
of Naguabo, Ceiba and Las Piedras; 39. - The municipalities of Fajardo and Vieques
and the Island of Culebra; and 40. - The municipalities of Rfo Grande, and Lofza and
Luquillo.
Section 2. Electoral zones numbers 1, 2, 3 and 4 included in three
representative districts within the senatorial district of San Juan are those presently
existing for purposes of electoral organization in the second precinct of San Juan.

ARTICLE IX
TRANSITORY PROVISIONS
Section 1. When this Constitution goes into effect all laws not inconsistent
therewith shall continue in full force until amended or repealed, or until they expire by
their own terms.
Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution, civil and criminal liabilities,
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rights, franchises, concessions, privileges, claims, actions, causes of action, contracts,
and civil criminal and administrative proceedings shall continue unaffected,
notwithstanding the taking effect of this Constitution.
Section 2. All officers who are in office by election or appointment on the date
this Constitution takes effect shall continue to hold their offices and to perform the
functions thereof in a manner no inconsistent with this Constitution, unless the
functions of their offices are abolished or until their successors are selected and
qualify in accordance with this Constitution and laws enacted pursuant thereto.
Section 3. Notwithstanding the age limit fixed by this Constitution for
compulsory retirement, all the judges of the courts of Puerto Rico who are holding
office on the date this Constitution takes effect shall continue to hold their judicial
offices until the expiration of the terms for which they were appointed, and in the case
of Justices of the Supreme Court during good behavior.
Section 4. The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico shall be the successor of the
People of Puerto Rico for all purposes, including without limitation the collection and
payments of debts and liabilities in accordance with their terms.
Section 5. When this constitution goes into effect, the term "citizen of the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico" shall replace the term "citizen of Puerto Rico" as
previously used.
Section 6. Political parties shall continue to enjoy all rights recognized by the
election law, provided that on the effective date of this Constitution they fulfill the
minimum requirements for the registration of new parties contained in said law. Five
years after this Constitution shall have taken effect the Legislative Assembly may
change these requirements, but any law increasing them shall not go into effect until
after the general election next following its enactment.
Section 7. The Legislative Assembly may enact the laws necessary to
supplement and make effective these transitory provisions in order to assure the
functioning of the government until the officers provided for by this Constitution are
elected or appointed and qualify, and until this Constitution takes effect in all respects.
Section 8. If the Legislative Assembly creates a Department of Commerce, the
Department of Agriculture and Commerce shall thereafter be called the Department of
Agriculture.
Section 9. The first election under the provisions of this Constitution shall be
held on the date provided by law, but not later than six months after the effective date
of this Constitution. The second general election under this Constitution shall be held
in the month of November 1956 on a day provided by law.
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Section 10. This Constitution shall take effect when the Governor so proclaims,
but not later than sixty days after its ratification by the Congress of the United States.

Done in Convention, at San Juan, Puerto
Rico, on the sixth day of February, in the year
of Our Lord one thousand nine hundred and
fifty-two.
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